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I was a highwayman, along the coach roads I did ride, with sword and pistol by
my side.
Many a young maid lost her baubles to my trade, many a soldier shed his life-
blood on my blade.
The bastards hung me in the spring of '25,
but I am still alive...
I fly a starship, across the universe divide.
And when I reach the other side,
I'll find a place to rest my spirit, if I can.
Perhaps I may become a highwayman again...
But I will remain, and I'll be back again and again and again.'
INTRODUCTION
During the days of the Wild West, the California Gold Rush brought
unforeseen wealth and unlimited opportutities for those who were will-
ing to brave the new frontier. The Gold Rush also brought danger in the
guise of the highwayman. The highwayman "originated among bad men
of the gold mining camps.... [H]e first robbed prospectors and miners
en route on foot to stage stations, of their gold dust and nuggets, becom-
ing bolder, looting stages and eventually after the railroads were built, he
'held-up' railway trains and robbed express cars."2 Highwaymen were
thieves and robbers who stole from innocent people; but they did not
necessarily view themselves that way. One highwayman, in a letter to a
banker, sought to justify his activities by emphasizing that he stole
chiefly from corporations.
"I do not think," he wrote, "that your Company should be too hard on me. I have
never directed against them particularly any matured scheme for plunder, or in
fact against anyone, and indeed I have had no definite idea in regard to the mat-
ter, unless it was that I should try to live honestly within the pale of society, and
if at any time compelled to trespass to supply my immediate wants, I would aim
at affluent corporations and never molest poor persons or private individuals."'
After the West became civilized, the establishment of law and order
made the highwayman a relic of the past. Has the highwayman returned
to the new frontier?
On the new frontier, highwaymen do not hold up stagecoaches with
pistols. Instead, they ply their trade on electronic boulevards armed with.
1. WAYLON JENNINGS ET AL, Highwayman, on HIGHWAYMAN (Columbia Records
1985).
2. WILLAM ALLAN PINKERTON, TRAIN ROBBERIES, TRAIN ROBBERS AND THE "HOLDU"
MEN 9 (1974).
3. JOSEPH HENRY JACKSON, BAD COMPANY 234-35 (1949).
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computers and modems. These highwaymen are not pillaging for gold.
They are plundering for information and looting the wealth of the elec-
tronic frontier. Jesse James has returned. But this time he is not riding a
horse. This highwayman is waiting by the road on his PC, hoping to pi-
rate content from those who drive the Information Superhighway.
As we advance into the digital age, there is widespread fear that copy-
right owners will be robbed of their "gold" by a society with no respect
for intellectual property rights and the effortless ability to infringe these
rights. Recent testimony at hearings on the Information Superhighway
indicates that most content providers fear superhighway robbery.4 One
executive explained that "[they] are particularly concerned that the
thieves, thugs, and highwaymen, if you will, will be more difficult than
ever to both identify and to apprehend in the new cyberspace."5
This concern is fueled by the increasing importance of copyright indus-
tries to the United States economy. From 1977 to 1991, copyright indus-
tries grew "at close to three times the rate of the economy as a whole;"6
by 1991, copyright industries employed 5.5 million people in the United
States.7 In 1993, copyright industries accounted for 6% of the United
States gross domestic product and contributed $40 billion to the balance
of trade.' Because copyright industries are becoming more valuable,
there is increasing apprehension about new technologies that may jeopar-
4. See Public Hearing at the University of Chicago before the Information Ifra-
structure Task Force, Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, (Sept. 14, 1994)
(hereinafter Working Group Hearing I]; Public Hearing at UCLA, before the Infor-
mation Infrastructure Task Force, Working Group on Intellectual Property, (Sept. 16,
1994) [hereinafter Working Group Hearing 11]; Public Hearing at the Andrew Mellon
Auditorium, before the Information Infrastructure Task Force, Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights, (Sept. 22, 1994) [hereinafter Working Group Hearing III];
Public hearing at the Andrew Mellon Auditorium, before the Information Infrastruc-
ture Task Force Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, (Sept. 23, 1994)
[hereinafter Working Group IV]. All transcripts are available from the Office of Legis-
lative and International Affairs, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office; from the IITF Bulle-
tin Board, accessible through the Internet by pointing the Gopher Client to
iitf.doc.gov or by tenet to iitf.doc.gov [login as gopher]; or via modem at 202-501-
1920.
5. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 75 (statement of John Kamp,
Senior Vice President, American Association of Advertising Agencies).
6. Id. at 49 (statement of Ann Harkins, Co-Director, Creative Incentive Coalition).
7. Id. at 50.
8. Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property-Our Once and Future Strength, 27 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1993-94).
dize them. Nowhere is this fear more prevalent than on the Information.
Superhighway.
This Comment discusses the implications of the Information Super-.
highway, also known as the National Information Infrastructure (NII), on
the copyrights of content providers. Section I explains what the Nil is
and how the Clinton Administration is confronting the emerging issues."
Section II will discuss the need for additional copyright protection in the
digital age. ° Section III surveys how current law and proposed changes
affect the bundle of rights associated with copyright on the Information
Superhighway." Section IV discusses infringement liability and propos-.
als for modifying liability standards. 2 Section V examines the remedies,
both civil and criminal, available to the copyright owner and what addi.-
tional remedies may be necessary to protect copyrights. 3
I. WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE?
The NII encompasses current and future communications. "It is a
broadband, multimedia electronic network through which digitally coded
information (voice, video, text, data, graphics, etc.) runs to and from any
point in the network."4 The NII will be a "seamless web of communica-
tions networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that will
put vast amounts of information at users' fingertips." By connecting:
people, via their computers, directly to other people and places, the NI
will allow access to information in unprecedented volumes-easily and.
inexpensively.6 The NII will allow people to exchange information any..
time, anywhere. 7 People will be able to use the NII for a myriad of pur-.
poses "including education, research, entertainment, sales, leisure, health
care, transportation, and banking." 8 The NII is expected to revolutionize
information and change our lives forever. 9
9. See infra notes 14-43 and accompanying text
10. See infra notes 48-113 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 114-355 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 356-553 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 554-88 and accompanying text.
14. Alan J. Hartnick, Law Changes Necessary for Information Superhighway?,
N.Y.L.J., June 9, 1995, at 5.
15. The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025,
49,025 (1993) [hereinafter Agenda for Action].
16. Ralph J. Andreotta, The National Information Infrastructure: Its Implications,
Opportunities, and Challenges, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 222 (1995).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 223.
19. Id. at 221; see also Al Gore, Remarks, 1994 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 1 (1994)
("[Tlhe NII will forever change the way all of us live, work, and learn .... It will
transform our lives.").
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A. How the NII has Developed
The primary model for the NI is the Internet.' The Internet evolved
from several government sponsored projects, including Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency Network (ARPAnet) and National Science Foun-
dation Network (NSFnet).2  The first computer network which forms
part of the Internet's backbone is ARPAnet, which was created in 1969
for the Department of Defense.' Because one of ARPAnet's purposes
was to provide computer-to-computer communications in the event of a
disaster, such as a nuclear war, it did not require a central computer to
function.' The NSFnet is another decentralized computer system that
forms the core of the Internet.24 The NSFnet was established in the ear-
ly 1980s to facilitate the speedy exchange of information between re-
searchers and distant academic and governmental institutions."
The federal government furthered development of the Nil when it
adopted the High Performance Computing Act of 1991.26 One of the
Act's purposes was to "establish a high-capacity and high-speed National
Research and Education Network."27 The Act provided nearly $3 billion
in federal funds to assist government agencies in developing the National
Research and Education Network (NREN).' Even in these early stages,
lawmakers recognized the need for promoting intellectual property pro-
tection and providing payment methods for use of copyrighted materials
on computer networks.29
20. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, GREEN PAPER: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE. A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 n.2 (1994) [hereinafter
WORKING GROUP DRAFr. All transcripts are available from the Office of Legislative
and International Affairs, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office; from the IITF Bulletin
Board, accessible through the Internet by pointing the Gopher Client to iitf.doc.gov or
by telnet to iitf.doc.gov [login as gopher]; or via modem at 202-501-1920.
21. Deborah Reilly, The National Iformation Infrastructure and Copyright: Inter-
sections and Tensions, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 903, 904 (1994).
22. Andrew Grosso, The National Information Infrastructure: Implications of the
Information Superhighway for Commerce, Security, and Law Enforcement, 41 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 481, 481-82 (1994).
23. Id.
24. Reilly, supra note 21, at 904-05.
25. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Liability on the Internet, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8,
1994, at 3.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5528 (1994).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 5502(1)(A) (1994).
28. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 5521(b), 5522(b), 5523(e), 5524(d), 5525(b), 5526(b) (1994).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(5)-(6) (1994).
Today, the Internet and other on-line communications networks are
booming. As of November 1995, the Internet connected thirty-seven mil.
lion adults in the United States and Canada,' with one million persom
added each month worldwide." Roughly four million people subscribe
to the three largest private on-line service providers-at least one million
to America Online, two million to CompuServe, and more than one mil.
lion to Prodigy.' The public and private sectors have begun to develop
what will be our NI.
B. How the Clinton Administration is Aiding Further Development of
the NII
The Clinton Administration is working with the private sector to culti.-
vate the National Information Infrastructure by sponsoring the NII initia.
tive.' The NII initiative has nine goals aimed at promoting the develop-
ment of the NII' In order to implement these goals, the Administration
The Network shall-
(5) be designed and operated so as to ensure the continued application
of laws that provide network and information resources security measures,
including those that protect copyright and other intellectual property rights,
and those that control access to data bases and protect national security;
(6) have accounting mechanisms which allow users or groups of users
to be charged for their usage of copyrighted materials available over the Net-
work and, where appropriate and technically feasible, for their usage of the
Network.
Id.
30. See Pending Copyright Bills: Hearings on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 Before the
House Subcomm. on Courts and InteU. Prop. and the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., (F.D.C.H.) (1995) (statement of the Honorable Carlos J.
Moorehead, member of the assembly), available in 1995 WL 676994.
31. See LA. Lorek, Worker Access Adds Internet Responsibilities for Companies.
Businesses Can Be Held Liable for Actions Their Employees Take On-line, Such as
Downloading Illegal or Copyrighted Information Off Network, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale), June 6, 1994, Business sec., at 11, available in 1994 WL 5407617; Carla
Lazzareschi, Businesses Create Cyberspace Land Rush on the Internet, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1993, at Dl.
32. Robin Dalmas, Globetrotting in Cyberspace, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Nov.
20, 1994, at El, available in 1994 WL 3857272; London Has Worlds Oldest Subway
System, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 21, 1994, at 4A.
33. See Agenda for Action, supra note 15, at 49,027 ("[G]overnment action can
compliment and enhance the benefits of these private sector initiatives.").
34. The nine goals are to:
(1) Promote private sector investment;
(2) Extend the "universal service" concept to ensure. that information re-
sources are available to all at affordable prices;
(3) Promote technological innovation and new applications;
(4) Promote seamless, interactive, user-driven operation;
(5) Ensure information security and network reliability;
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established a federal interagency Information Infrastructure Task Force
(IITF).3
The IITF consists of three committees: the Telecommunications Policy
Committee, the Information Policy Committee, and the Applications
Committee.' Within the Information Policy Committee there are three
working groups: the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, the
Working Group on Privacy, and the Working Group on Government In-
formation.3 ' The Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (the
Working Group) is responsible for evaluating intellectual property
protections on the Nil.'
The Working Group is "simply trying to adopt traditional principles
which are balanced in our country to modem technology. " ' To help
accomplish this purpose, the Working Group solicited public comment
rega.ding adequacy of copyright law for the NII, fair use, labeling and
encoding, interoperability, licensing, technical protection, and public
awareness and education." In July 1994, the Working Group published a
(6) Improve management of the radio frequency spectrum;
(7) Protect intellectual property rights. The Administration will investigate
how to strengthen domestic copyright laws and international intellectual
property treaties to prevent piracy and to protect the integrity of intellectual
property;
(8) Coordinate with other levels of government and with other nations;
(9) Provide access to government information and improve government pro-
curement.
Id. at 49,027-31 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 49,035.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 64 (statement of Bruce A.
Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks, Chair).
40. See Request for Comments of Intellectual Property Issues Involved in the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure Initiative, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,917 (1993); Public Hearing
on Intellectual Property Issues Involved in the National Information Infrastructure
Initiative at Marriott Hotel, Arlington, Va. before the Information Infrastructure
Task Force Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (Nov. 18, 1993). All tran-
scripts are available from the Office of Legislative and International Affairs, U.S. Pat-
ent & Trademark Office; from the IITF Bulletin Board, accessible through the Internet
by pointing the Gopher Client to iitf.doc.gov or by telnet to iitf.doc.gov [login as
gopher]; or via modem at 202-501-1920. See also Information Policy: Hearing on
National Information Infrastructure Focuses on IP Issues, 47 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. 80 (BNA) (Nov. 25, 1993).
preliminary draft of their report on these issues, which they followed by
holding public hearings and soliciting written comments on the report's
findings.4' The Working Group released the final draft of the report on
September 5, 1995.42 In response to the final report, Congress intro-
duced several bills to implement the Working Group's recommendations
for changes to the Copyright Act."
Since their release, the Working Group reports have been a spring-
board for heated debate on the copyright issues surrounding the NIl. The
rest of this Comment will focus on four areas of this debate: (1) Is there
a need for additional copyright protection on the NII;" (2) What rights
are affected by the NIl and what additional legislation is needed to pro-
tect those rights;45 (3) Who should be responsible for infringement of
those rights;46 and (4) What remedies are necessary to protect those
rights.47
II. THE NEED FOR COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Do we really need added copyright protection for the NII? The Copy-
right Reform Act of 1976 was enacted with the hope that the new copy-
right laws would be elastic enough to expand with new technologies.4
41. WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra note 20; Working Group Hearings I-JV, supra
note 4.
42. Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights (1995) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT].
43. See H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. (introduced Sept. 29, 1995); S. 1284,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Sept. 28, 1995); see also S. 982, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (introduced June 29, 1995) (revising federal criminal code provisions regarding
fraud and related activity in connection with computers); S. 1122, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (introduced Aug. 4, 1995) (providing greater copyright protection by amending
criminal copyright provision of Titles 17 and 18).
44. See infra notes 48-113 and accompanying text.
45. -See infra notes 114-355 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 356-553 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 554-88 and accompanying text.
48. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess.
1, 51-53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. 5659, 5664-66. This intention is made
clear in the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act. Id. The House Report rec-
ognizes that, while new modes of expression constantly arise, it is impossible to
predict what these modes will be. Id. at 51, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5664. Therefore, the
Copyright Act was enacted not only with established guidelines, but also "with suffi-
cient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts." Id. at 53, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5666; see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). In defining the subject matter
of copyright, the statute indicates that works "fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, now known or later developed" are granted copyright protection. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). The copyright code is replete with such
examples. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1996) (defining "copies," "device," "machine,"
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Although new technologies create questions about the adequacy of exist-
ing copyright law,49 thus far the Act has proven flexible and adequate.
Existing copyright law has met the challenge of infringement problems
associated with copy machines,' VCRs,5' and computers.52 Why does
the NII, then, breed rampant concern that present law will not continue
to afford enough protection for copyrights?
A. Why the NI is Different
Digital technology makes the NIl different. By transforming informa-
tion into a series of zeros and ones, digitization creates unique problems
with enormous potential for abuse. First, digital technology makes it
"easy and inexpensive" for any user to make "an unlimited number of
perfect copies."' Second, an unlimited number of users can upload and
download information quickly and easily when it is in digital form.'
.process" and "phonorecords").
49. See Matthew Goldstein, Bringing Order to Unruly World of Info Networks,
N.Y.LJ., Aug. 30, 1994, at 1 (referring to statements by Marybeth Peters, U.S. Regis-
trar of Copyrights, that photocopiers, for example, have caused apprehension).
50. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (awarding damages to book publishers in copyright infringement action for a
duplication business' unauthorized photocopying). But see Working Group Hearing IV,
supra note 4, at 23 (statement of Janice Hopkins Tanne, President, American Society
of Journalists and Authors) (arguing that photocopy infringement is rampant, despite
the Kinko's decision).
51. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(holding that sale of VCRs to the general public does not infringe on television pro-
gram copyrights).
52. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (1993) (holding that
copying for copyright purposes occurs when a computer program is loaded into a
computer's RAM).
53. With digital technology, a hundredth generation copy. is equivalent in quality to
a second generation copy which is equivalent in quality to the original-this was not
possible with analog technology. See Working Group Hearing If, supra note 4, at 58
(statement of Michael Malone, President, San Diego Software Industry Council, on
behalf of the Alliance to Promote Software Innovation); see also Amy Hetzner, Feds
May Change Copyright Law for On-line Protection, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 19, 1994, at
D1, available in 1994 WL 4276941 (lamenting the unauthorized copying associated
with new technology); James A. Martin, Computers Make It Easy to Steak As Tech-
nology Advances Copyrighted Materials Are Becoming More Vulnerable, S.F. EXAMIN-
ER, Apr. 17, 1994, at Cl, available in 1994 WL 4249288 (noting rapid increase in
number of people who have ability to copy works).
54. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 58 (statement of Michael Malone,
President, San Diego Software Industry Council, on behalf of the Alliance to Promote
Third, various media can be converted to digital form and easily changed
to create nev works, allowing access to forms of information previously
unavailable on individual computers.' Fourth, there is greater difficulty
in detecting the infringer when massive amounts of information are
speeding through numerous computer networks.5
B. How Existing Threats to Copyright Protection may Grow with the
NII
Even now, while the NII project is incomplete, piracy is threatening
copyright industries. Industry groups estimate that software publishers
lose an estimated $12 billion annually, $2.2 billion in the United States
alone, to piracy.57 In the United States, about one-third of this piracy oc-
curs electronically on the Internet and other on-line services-a statistic
that is increasing rapidly.' Many of those who pirate software are not
"typical criminals," but are regular people who have developed a differ-
ent attitude about stealing intellectual property than they might have
about stealing gold.' In fact, most infringements involve individual us-
ers who choose to copy works without paying a fee.' Because infringe-
ment has become so readily accepted in our society, piracy is difficult to
deter and infringement liability is difficult to enforce."'
With the completion of the NII, piracy may be even more rampant.'
For example, books that are now purchased at a bookstore or checked
out from a library may eventually be available solely via digital
distribution.' Without effective protection, an NII user could receive an
entire book, then copy and re-transmit it numerous times to many other
users, without compensating the publisher. Piracy of this sort could gen-
Software Innovation).
55. Id.
56. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 48 (statement of Ann Harkins,
Co-Director, Creative Incentive Coalition).
57. Stephanie Stahl, Highway Robbery?: Piracy Cases Involve Software Distributed
Via the Internet, INFORMATION WK., Apr. 25, 1994, at 17; Adam S. Bauman, The Pi-
rates of the Internet, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at Al.
58. Bauman, supra note 57, at Al.
59. See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at *7 (noting
that breaking software piracy laws "has become so socially acceptable that only a
thin minority appears compelled . . . to obey them").
60. Hetzner, supra note 53.
61. See, e.g., United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994)
(dismissing criminal charges against Internet user who pirated $1 million worth of
software because duplication was not done for profit).
62. WORING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 10.
63. See Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 16 (statement of Heather
Florence, Bantam Doubleday, on behalf of the Association' of American Publishers).
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erate enormous losses that may eventually lead to the destruction of
whole copyright industries.' 4
Unfortunately, superhighway robbery would not be limited to the prop-
erty of "affluent corporations. "' Currently, CompuServe has a listing of
magazine articles that can be ordered from copy services.' When these
articles are copied, the writer who holds the copyright is not paid."
Such copyright violations, as they become widespread, could filch all
compensation from individual authors.' The superhighwayman, left un-
checked, could despoil the livelihood of many people.
C. What will Happen if Added Protections are not Implemented?
"Intellectual property protection is the very foundation for the NII,
providing necessary incentives and rewards for the development of the
infrastructure and the content."' 9 Without such incentives and rewards,
proponents of copyright reform claim authors and creators will leave the
Nil devoid of content.7" Additionally, investors assert that they will not
64. See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text.
65. See supra text accompanying note 3.
66. Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 23 (statement of Janice Hopkins
Tanne, President, American Society of Journalists and Authors).
67. Id.
68. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 10.
69. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 73 (statement of William Ellis,
Washington Intellectual Property Counsel, IBM, on behalf of the Computer and Busi-
ness Equipment Manufacturers Association). Inimical to this popular position, howev-
er, is a controversial article by John Perry Barlow. Barlow, supra note 59. Mr.
Barlow suggests that even strengthened copyright protection will never effectively
deal with the challenges posed by digital technology. Id. at *1. "Intellectual property
law cannot be patched, retrofitted or expanded to contain digitized expression any
more than real estate law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting
spectrum." Id. The reason for this, he asserts, is because digital information is not a
material good, and thus, there is no physical link between the creators of work and
the value of their work. Id. at *2-5. Without a physical link, the creators will only be
able to claim the ideas underlying the work, and not the work itself-a claim which
would be legally and practically ineffectual. Id. at *5-6; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)
(providing that copyright protection does not extend to ideas).
If creators attempt to copyright ideas, then copyright enforcement will become a
battle between legions of lawyers. Barlow, supra note 59, at *6. "Threatening their
opponents with the endless purgatory of litigation, over which some might prefer
death itself, [the lawyers will] assert claim to any thought which might have served
another cranium." Id. The ultimate result would be copyright anarchy, where legal en-
forcement would be useless. Id. at *6-8.
70. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
risk investing in the NII without assurances of adequate copyright pro-
tection.7'
1. Disintegration of the Incentive-based System for Creators
The magnitude of the NII makes the far-reaching potential for copy-
right abuse and the economic threat of piracy an overriding concern for
content providers. 2 Authors and creators are hesitant to make their
products available on the NII without assurance that they will be com-
pensated fairly.' Furthermore, content providers are unwilling to sac-
rifice the right to control their works.74 Thus, if the NI's full potential is
to be realized, the law must alleviate these concerns.75
2. Risking the Loss of Private Investment
To finance further NII development, the Clinton Administration is
counting on private investment, rather than relying strictly on public
funds.76 Managers of existing information companies will not be willing
to wager their investment on the NII if there is any significant risk that
they will never see a return.77 Moreover, private entities that are actively
71. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
72. See Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 62 (statement of Milton Olin,
Senior Vice President of Business and Legal Affairs, A & M Records). Explaining his
company's hesitation to post information on electronic bulletin boards, Mr. Olin sim-
ply states, "[w]e'li need rules. We can't do it without having protections and rules."
Id.
73. National Research Council, Realizing the Information Future, ch. 6, (visited
March 1995) <ftp://ftp.nas.edu/pub/reports/realizing_the_information_future go-
pher.//gopher.nas.edu:70/11/./nap/online/rtif or http://www.nas.edu/>.
74. See Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1 (citing concerns recognized by Mary Beth
Peters, U.S. Registrar of Copyrights).
75. In the Working Group Report and the Working Group Draft, the Working
Group supports the position that without strong copyright protection, providers will
not supply the content necessary to drive the NI. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra
note 42, at 10-11; WORIUNG GROUP DRAFr, supra note 20, at 6-7; accord Working
Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 31 (statement of Jim Schatz on behalf of West
Publishing Co.). Mr. Schatz avers that "content providers will not be willing to in-
clude their content on the Nil if their intellectual property rights are not effectively
protected. Of course, if content providers don't include their content on the NII, the
NI cannot reach its lofty goals and great potential." Id.; see also Working Group
Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 29 (statement of Marilyn Bergman, President, American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers) ("The content will depend on whether
we, who are creators of the copyrighted works, are secure in the knowledge that our
rights are protected.").
76. See Agenda for Action, supra note 15, at 49,027; cf. The High Performance
Computing Act of 1991, 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5528 (1994) (the NREN was developed
with $3 billion in federal funds).
77. The Working Group also acknowledges that "owners of intellectual property
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building and developing the Nil will not entrust further resources to a
project that is not profitable.'8 Therefore, in order to secure the trust of
private investors in the NII, adequate copyright protection is essential.79
Without strong copyright laws, those who will ride the NI may get "a li-
cense to steal intellectual property cheaply, [and] easily,"' which will
dissuade those who will drive the NII from putting their commodities at
risk.
D. Are the Content Providers Bluffing?
On the opposite side of the NI protection debate are experts who
claim that copyright reform is unnecessary.8 These experts reject the
content providers' arguments that without enhanced protection the NIl
will be barren,' underdeveloped,' or legally impotent.'
1. Lack of Content?
Even without any changes in copyright law, business on-line is boom-
ing.' There are over 5000 databases and 6000 discussion groups on the
Internet;' anyone who surfs the Net can attest to the fact that lack of
rights will not be willing to put their interests at risk if the appropriate systems . . .
are not in place." WORING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 10; see, e.g., Working
Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 45 (statement of Edward Massie, President and
CEO, Commerce Clearing House) (insisting that information companies are concerned
about investment risks of the NII, especially with the common public perception that
information from the Nil will be free of charge).
78. See Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 20-21 (statement of Priscilla
Walter, Partner and Intellectual Property Department Chairperson, Gardner, Carton &
Douglas) (attesting to fact that clients who invest in the NII are concerned about
protecting their investment).
79. See id. (statement of Priscilla Walter, Partner and Intellectual Property Depart-
ment Chairperson, Gardner, Carton & Douglas).
80. National Research Council, supra note 73, ch. 6.
81. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ.
29, 43-44 (1994) (criticizing the argument that without copyright protection on the
Nil, content will be scarce); Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NIl Intellectu-
at Property Report, 37 COMM. ACM 21, 26 (Dec. 1994) (arguing that the NII networks
will not be "empty pipelines awaiting content" in the absence of added protection).
82. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
86. William Charland, Keep Your Head Above Water in the Flood of Information,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 18, 1994, at 3C.
content is not a problem that the Internet is facing. Magazine companies,
book publishers, news broadcasters, television networks, musicians and
concert sponsors, newspapers, art galleries, motion picture companies,
and advertising agencies have gone on-line-including prominent entities
such as McGraw-Hill, Time Inc., ABC, NBC, CBS, Los Angeles Times,
Newsday, Twentieth Century Fox, and the Rolling Stones." Thus, even
without copyright reform, the NII will certainly not be "devoid of con-
tent."8
2. Inhibition of Development?
Professor Jessica Litman' challenges the argument that NII growth
will be stunted without enhanced copyright protection.' She points to
several historical examples where industries flourished because they had
greater copyright exceptions, rather than protections; yet, related indus-
tries were not destroyed." The video movie rental business is thriving
because of the first sale exception;' yet, the movie industry remains
vibrant.' Cable television prospers because of a copyright exemption;'
"yet, there is no dearth of television programming. "" Copyright exemp-
tion, rather than copyright protection, has proven to be fuel behind the
machine of progress.
87. See Bits and Bytes, Hous. POsT, Oct. 30, 1994, at D3; Deidre Carmody, Time
Inc. Moves to Take Lead in Interactive Publishing: Some of Its Magazines Will Test
Internet's Waters, TIMES UNION (Albany), Oct 24, 1994, at C8; Dottie Enrico & James
Overstreet, Life Imitates MCI Ads: Internet Users Can Visit Fictional Publisher, USA
TODAY, Nov. 15, 1994, at 7B, available in 1994 WL 11074403; Marc Gunther, Last of
Big Three Networks On-Line; Interactive Skeptic, DEr. FREE PRESS, Oct. 24, 1994, at
IE; In the News, Hous. PoST, Oct. 25, 1994, at C2; Lazzareschi, supra note 31; Staci
D. Kramer, TV On-Line Network News Departments Jump on the Information Super-
highway, CI. TRIn., Nov. 11, 1994, Tempo sec., at 2, available in 1994 WL 6543343;
Media Talk in Print and on the Air: Time Inc. Is Blazing Media Trail With Its
Interactive Pathfinder, AT. J. & CONST., Oct. 25, 1994, at D3, available in 1994 WL
4495253; Steve Pond, Dateline Hollywood-On-Line Box Office Buzz, WASH. POST,
Nov. 15, 1994, at C7; Robin Rauzi, Virtual Reality Poses Challenge to Curators Se-
ries: Part 3 of a Series, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 30, 1994, at 1J, available in
1994 WL 7234789; Rolling in Cyberspace: Stones' Will Broadcast Concert on the
Internet, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, at E5, available in 1994 WL 3659942.
88. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text
89. Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law.
90. Litman, supra note 81, at 46.
91. Id. at 4647.
92. Id. at 46: see 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) (authorizing the first sale doctrine for
video rentals). For a further discussion of the first sale doctrine, see infra notes 190-
206 and accompanying text
93. Litman, supra note 81, at 46-47.
94. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994) (secondary transmission exemption).
95. Litman, supra note 81, at 47.
[Vol. 24: 121, 1996] Information Superhighway
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
3. Inadequacy of Existing Protections?
Another argument, advanced by Professor Pamela Samuelson,' is that
systems which already exist in frontier justice and the current law ade-
quately protect the content provider's rights.7 "[Tihe principal norm of
[the Internet is not] 'to require copyright owners to check their copy-
rights at the door' when they enter" the system.' Bulletin board system
operators enforce copyright protections by denying access to infring-
ers.' Active discussions about perceived copyright violations on the Net
also help discourage infringement."° Finally, "Netiquette," the informal
rules for using the Internet, discourages copyright violations.'
In Samuelson's opinion, "the vast majority of net users" follow the
current copyright laws and do not rob content providers of their intellec-
tual property."° Instead, they use copyrighted materials fairly, and en-
courage others to do the same."° Any changes in the law, she con-
cludes, should draw from the strengths of existing networks and rules by
finding a "Pareto optimal" "° solution-one which serves NII users and
providers.' 5
E. Finding a Balance
Both the proponents of NII copyright reform, representing content
providers, and reform opponents, representing NII users, have sustain-
able positions. In the midst of this sharply divided debate, the purposes
and goals of copyright law should not be forgotten. The Constitution
charges Congress with the duty "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
96. Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
97. Samuelson, supra note 81, at 26.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. But see WORKING GROuP REPOir, supra note 42, at 15 (arguing that reli-
ance on such informal restraints would make the NH "a veritable copyright Dodge
city").
102. Samuelson, supra note 81, at 26.
103. Id.
104. "When the economy's resources and output are allocated in such a way that
no reallocation can make anyone better off without making at least one other person
worse off, then a Pareto optimum is said to exist." MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN Eco-
NOMICS 320 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986).
105. Samuelson, supra note 81, at 26.
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. "106 This
constitutional mandate does not mean that copyright protection is im-
pregnable. On the contrary, in interpreting this provision, Congress and
the Supreme Court have recognized a balance between the rights of con-
tent providers and the demands of information consumers. 7 Allowing
use of information, not just permitting exclusive control of information,
fosters the constitutional purpose of copyright laws.'08
Any copyright reform intended to pave the way for the Information
Superhighway should also reflect this balance between copyright owners
and information users."° The Clinton Administration acknowledges that
"[t]he broad public interest in promoting the dissemination of informa-
tion to our citizens must be balanced with the need to ensure the integri-
ty of intellectual property rights and copyrights in information and enter-
tainment products [on the NII]."" ° The Working 'Group's"' proposals
have been criticized as not satisfying these standards but instead threat-
ening to disturb the equilibrium by heavily favoring copyright owners
over Nil users."2
106. U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 8.
107. See infra notes 114-32 and accompanying text (examining the rights afforded
as well as the limitations imposed by Congress under the Copyright Act); H.R. REP.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (explaining that the Copyright Act is based
on the constitutional ground of promoting public welfare by securing limited exclu-
sive rights to authors); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 428-29 (1984) (recognizing that the Act only grants limited rights so as to ad-
vance the constitutional purpose of spurring creativity while still allowing public ac-
cessibility).
108. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 62 (statement of Lucretia
McClure on behalf of the Medical Library Association and the Association of Academ-
ic Health Science Directors). For a debate on the rights of creators as opposed to
the right to appropriation, see Virtual Reality, Appropriation, and Property Rights in
Art: A Roundtable Discussion, 13 CARDOZO ARrs & ENT. LJ. 89 (1994). Though not
specifically referring to the Nil, one panelist expressed dismay that, in the copyright
field, there is immense concern about the protection of creators and only negligible
interest in the dissemination of information for public benefit. Id. at 103.
109. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 62 (statement of Lucretia
McClure on behalf of the Medical Library Association and the Association of Academ-
ic Health Science Directors); Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 33
(statement of Gloria Werner, University Librarian, UCLA, on behalf of the Association
of Research Libraries).
110. Agenda for Action, supra note 15, at 49,030. But see Reilly, supra note 21, at
908 (criticizing the Clinton Administration for not paying enough attention to copy-
right laws in NI development).
ill. The Working Group was created by the Clinton Administration to help meet
this goal for the NIL See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
112. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 33 (statement of Gloria Wemer,
University Librarian, UCLA, on behalf of the Association of Research Libraries);
Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 23-24 (statement of Alfred Willis, Head
Art Librarian, UCLA, on behalf of the Art Library Society of North America); id. at
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The next section of this Comment evaluates the Working Group's pro-
posals for modifications of and additions to existing copyright law using
this balancing test: Do the proposals promote the dissemination of infor-
mation on the Nil while still effectively protecting the rights of copyright
owners, thereby promoting "the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts"?
1 13
Il. THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
The scope of copyright protection extends to "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.""' Copyright own-
ership does not reach to the underlying ideas in a work.' A copyright
owner has the privilege to exercise and to authorize any of the following
five exclusive rights in their work:..6
(1) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the work; 7
(2) to publicly perform the work; 8
(3) to publicly display the work;"9
67 (statement of Jessica Litman, Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of
Law).
113. U.S. CONrST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Section 102 of the copyright code forms the
"idea/expression" dichotomy-a fundamental principle of copyright law. See MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[B] (1994) (explaining the
idea/expression dichotomy). Because of this principle, the expression of an author's
ideas receives copyright protection, not the underlying ideas themselves. Id.
116. The code includes, but does not limit, the following categories as protectible
works: literature, music, drama, pantomime, choreography, pictures, graphics, sculp-
tures, motion' pictures, audiovisual works, sound recordings, architectural works, com-
pilations, and derivative works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994) (clarifying that the term "including" is "illustrative and not limitative").
117. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994); see ifra notes 133-66 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the scope of the distribution right).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994); see infra notes 302-33 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the scope of the performance right). The performance right is limited to "lit-
erary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures
and other audiovisual works." 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1994); see infra notes 334-39 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the scope of the display right). The display right is limited to "literary, musi-
cal, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1994).
(4) to reproduce copies or phonorecords of the work;20 and
(5) to prepare derivative works.'2
Additionally, authors of visual art are granted moral rights.'22 Exclusive
rights are fully divisible and are not mutually exclusive."
There are boundaries to these exclusive rights. Limitations include first
sale,124 fair use,'25 computer program'26 and library archiving,'27 cer-
tain public performances or displays,'28 secondary transmissions,20
and ephemeral recordings."' Furthermore, certain types of works in-
120. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994); see infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the scope of the reproduction right in the context of the Nil).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994); see ifra notes 340-55 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the scope of the right to make derivative works). The right to prepare deriva-
tive works is also known as the "adaptation right." Mark C. Dukes & Craig N. Killen,
Protection for Works of 'Authors: An Overview of Copyright Principles, 6 S.C. LAw.
28, 30 (July/Aug. 1994).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). Together, the rights of attribution and integrity are
known as "moral rights." An analysis of moral rights is beyond the scope of this
Comment For further discussion of the current state of moral rights in the United
States, see Edward J. Damish, Moral Rights Protection and Resale Royalties for Visu-
al Art in the United States: Development and Current Status, 12 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENTI. LJ. 387 (1994); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 115, § 8D (analyzing
moral rights issues of copyright).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994). Thus, if a copyright owner has lost or given up the
right to authorize performance of the work, for example, the copyright owner still
has the exclusive right to authorize the distribution, display, or reproduction of the
work or preparation of derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994). Furthermore,
infringement liability can be based on a violation of one or more of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 100; Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984); infra Sec. IV
(infringement liability).
124. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994); see infra notes 207-28 and accompanying text The first
sale doctrine allows an owner of a copy of a protected work to transfer that copy to
another person without permission from the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(1994).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The fair use limitation is included in this list for illus-
trative purposes. A complete discussion of fair use is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994). The computer program limitation is included in this list
for illustrative purposes. A complete discussion of computer programming is beyond
the scope of this Comment
127. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994). The library archiving limitation is included in this list
for illustrative purposes. A complete discussion of library archiving is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994). Notably, some performances transmitted via the
radio are excluded from the performance right. Other excluded performances and
displays include those for educational, religious, and nonprofit purposes. 17 U.S.C.
§ 110 (1994).
129. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119 (1994).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
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volve specific qualifications, such as the omission of a performance right
for sound recordings. 3' The Copyright Act also imposes restrictions on
alienation, such as compulsory licensing for musical works.32
A. The Distribution Right
Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act grants an exclusive right "to dis-
tribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.""3
The public distribution right is limited by the first sale doctrine, which
allows the copyright owner to control only the first public distribution of
a copy."u The Working Group proposes that the Copyright Act be al-
tered to include the exclusive right to distribute by transmission. ' 5 This
change, the Working Group argues, is essential to extend the distribution
right to the digital superhighway."
1. Recent Cases Involving Digital Distribution
Even without a change in the distribution right statute, recent case law
supports a finding that digital transmission implicates the distribution
right. ' 7 In Playboy Enterprises v. Frena,'" the district court held that
131. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1994).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994). The methods of distribution listed in section 106(3)
seem to contemplate a hard copy changing hands. WORKING GRouP REPORT, supra
note 42, at 68-69; WORKING GROUP DRAFT, supra note 20, at 39.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994); see infra notes 190-228 and accompanying text. Once a
copy is sold or ownership is transferred, the first sale doctrine allows the new owner
to make a like distribution of that particular copy of the work without authority
from, or liability to, the original owner. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying
text. As applied to computer programs and sound recordings, the first sale doctrine
is more restrictive. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text. For example, fol-
lowing the first sale, any further "rental, lease, or lending" of a copy of a computer
program, for direct or indirect commercial advantage, is an infringement of the copy-
right owner's distribution right. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
135. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 213-17; WOmNG GROUP DRAFT,
supra note 20, at 121. As amended, this section would read: "(3) to distribute copies
or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, or by transmission." WORKING GROUP RE-
PORT, supra note 42, at app. 2, p.1; WORKING GROUP DRAFT, supra note 20, at 121.
136. See WORIaNG GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 213-17.
137. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Ma. 1993) (find-
ing liability for digital transmissions of photographs); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA,
Techs Warehouse, a subscription bulletin board service (BBS) operated
by George Frena, infringed Playboy's exclusive right to publicly distribute
and display copyrighted photographs.'39 The service, which contained
170 image files of Playboy's copyrighted photographs, allowed subscrib-
ers to download digital copies of the photographs from the BBS into
their own computers." Further, subscribers could upload digital copies
of photographs from their own computers onto the BBS.'4 ' In granting
partial summary judgment, the court summarily determined that "[t]here
is no dispute that Defendant Frena supplied a product containing unau-
thorized copies of a copyrighted work."'42 The court found that the digi-
tal transmissions between the BBS and the subscribers' computers violat-
ed Playboy's exclusive distribution and display rights.'43
In another case involving digital distribution, Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v.
MAPHIA,' 4 a computer video game manufacturer and distributor sued
a BBS entitled "MAPHIA" for piracy of copyrighted video games.' The
court issued a preliminary injunction against MAPHIA and Chad
Scherman, a MAPHIA operator.'46 In its findings of fact, the court deter-
mined that MAPHIA was an unauthorized channel for distribution of
infringing copies of Sega's video games.'47 After finding that MAPHIA
and its operators distributed unauthorized copies of Sega's copyrighted
video games, the court reached a conclusion of law that Sega established
a prima facie case of copyright infringement.'" In its findings, the court
never actually stated that there was prima facie evidence of a distribu-
tion right violation, only of "unauthorized copying.""'
857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (imposing liability for on-line distribution of
computer software).
138. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1552.
139. Id. at 1554-57.
140. Id. at 1554.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1556.
143. Id. at 1556-57.
144. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
145. Id. at 681-84.
146. Id. at 682.
147. The court made findings of fact related to distribution including the following:
(1) MAPHIA users upload and download Sega's video games; (2) Users can make and
distribute unauthorized copies of Sega video games that they copy from MAPHIA; (3)
Unauthorized copying and distribution of Sega video games harms Sega's reputation
and the commercial market for their games; (4) Distribution of Sega's video games
via MAPHIA is profitable for the operators of MAPHIA; (5) Pre-release versions of
Sega's games are distributed via MAPHIA; and (6) Sega's reputation is damaged by
loss of control over the quality and possible alteration of copies distributed via
MAPHIA. Id. at 683-84.
148. Id. at 686-89.
149. Id. at 686.
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In its brief analysis, the Sega court relied on MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc.'" to establish that "unauthorized copying of copy-
righted computer programs is prima facie infringement of copyright."'5'
MAI stated that "it is generally accepted that the loading of software into
a computer constitutes the creation of a copy under the Copyright
Act.""'52 On its face, this statement seems to implicate only the repro-
duction right of copyrighted software. In Sega, however, the defendants'
activities were not limited to loading software into a computer.'" As
the findings of fact indicate, MAPHIA was a tool for the operators to dis-
tribute copies of Sega's copyrighted software and for the users to repro-
duce those copies." Therefore, the "unauthorized copying" by the de-
fendants was both a direct violation of the distribution right and an indi-
rect violation of the reproduction right.'55
Furthermore, in the findings of fact, the court indicated that users
made one or more unauthorized copies from the single copy that was
posted on MAPHIA.' Assuming that the single copy was obtained law-
fully, the operators, by "lending" their copy to users who, in turn, made
additional copies, also violated the first sale restriction on computer
programs."' This restriction makes it unlawful to lend, lease, or rent,
for direct or indirect commercial advantage, a copyrighted computer pro-
gram without permission from the original copyright owner." Under
this section, an infringement action derives from the exclusive distribu-
tion right.'55 Although the court did not explicitly rely on the distribu-
tion right in its conclusions of law, the distribution right was clearly im-
plicated in Sega.'"
The first class action suit to challenge the electronic dissemination of
copyrighted songs on the Internet was recently settled. 6 ' This suit was
150. 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1996).
151. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686.
152. MAI, 991 F.2d at 519.
153. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 683-84.
154. Id.; see supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (outlining the various uses
of the unauthorized copying).
155. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686-87.
156. Id. at 684.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1994); see infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text
(explaining this first sale exclusion).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1994).
159. Id. at § 109 (b)(2)(B)(u).
160. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
161. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov.
considered to be an important "test case" for many of the copyright is-
sues facing the NI. '62 In the suit, Frank Music, on behalf of a class of
music publishers, claimed that while 550 songs were uploaded, stored,
and downloaded through CompuServe's commercial on-line information
service, no royalty payments were made to the music publishers.'"
Frank Music maintained that CompuServe profited from permitting, facil-
itating, and participating in those activities that deprived the music pub-
lishers of their rightful compensation." As one defense, CompuServe
asserted that the action was barred by the statutory protection of the
Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA). 'w Under the AHRA, there is no
copyright violation when a consumer reproduces music for noncommer-
cial use, but there can be a copyright violation when a vendor distributes
the work.'" Thus, an adjudication of whether CompuServe distributed
the songs or the consumers merely reproduced the songs could have
been important in determining the scope of musical right protection on
the NI. Because the case settled, these legal questions remain unan-
swered.
29, 1993). The settlement provides that CompuServe, without admitting liability, will
pay the Harry Fox Agency an amount that will in turn be distributed to the affected
music publishers. Michael I. Rudell, Music Legislation Meets the Digital Age, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 22, 1995, at 3.
162. Teresa Riordan, Cyberspace Needs New Copyright Laws, DAILY NEWS OF L.A.,
July 7, 1994, at B2; see News and Comment: Briefs: Copyrights, Infringement, 47
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 162 (BNA) (Dec. 16, 1993) (discussing the "cloudy"
legal issues raised by the Frank case and the Information Superhighway); Edward R.
Silverman, Computer Services Hit a Sour Note: Suit Demands Royalties on Songs
Retrieved from Bulletin Boards, NEWSDAY, Apr. 25, 1994, at C2 (discussing the issues
and property at stake in this landmark case).
163. Michael . Rudell, Rights Problems Posed by Multimedia, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1994,
at 3; Josh Hyatt, Highway Robbery: The Information Superhighway Has Not Yet
Reached Homes, but the Legal Issues It Raises Are Already Generating Traffic in
the Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 1994, Business sec., at 29, available in 1994 WL
5995986. Section 115 of the Copyright Act subjects the owners of music copyrights to
compulsory licensing. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994). Under this compulsory licensing scheme,
once a musical work has been distributed to the public, any person can obtain a
compulsory license to further make and distribute copies of the work. Id. The com-
pulsory license holder must, however, pay a statutory royalty to the copyright owner
of the musical work. Id. The royalties generated for musical works are significant; in
1993, for example, the Harry Fox Agency, a royalty collection agency, collected $300
million on behalf of music publishers. Silverman, supra note 162, at C2.
164. Rudell, supra note 163, at 3. CompuServe, which earned $135 million from sub-
scriber payments in 1993, is the largest private on-line service provider in the United
States. Silverman, supra note 162, at C2.
165. Rudell, supra note 163, at 3; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994).
166. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1008 (1994).
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2. Working Group Recommendations for the Distribution Right
The Working Group posits that the current public distribution right
and the corresponding first sale exception only cover transactions where
a tangible "copy" changes hands but do not include distributions that
transfer nonmaterial goods."7 Such a requirement renders the distribu-
tion right ineffective in the digital environment because digital transfer
occurs through bit streams, not by the transfer of physical objects."
The Working Group further recognizes that, in reality, a digital
transmission can be a distribution even when a hard copy is not trans-
ferred." To close this gap, the Working Group proposes that Congress
amend the language of the distribution right in § 106(3) of Title 17 to in-
clude the exclusive right to distribute by transmission.70
3. Is the Proposed Distribution Amendment Necessary to Balance the
Goals of Disseminating Information and Protecting Copyright
Owners' Rights-Thereby Promoting the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts?
Copyright owners believe that the proposed amendment is necessary
to protect their distribution rights from the bandits of the Information
Superhighway. 7' Like the Working Group, copyright owners are con-
cerned that because digital transmission is not a physical transfer of a
material object, the present language of § 106(3) could prevent them
from asserting their distribution right on the NII.' Whether the pro-
167. WORIaNG GROUP DRAFr, supra note 20, at 39; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defin-
ing "copies" and "phonorecords" as "material objects").
168. WORING GROUP DRA.Fr, supra note 20, at 39, 120-21; Samuelson, supra note
81, at 22.
169. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 213, 216; WORING GROUP DRAFr,
supra note 20, at 121.
170. WORKING GROUP Dw'r, supra note 20, at 121. As amended, this section would
read: "(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership .... by rental, lease, or lending, or by
transmission."
Id. at 121; see also WORIUNG GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 1.
171. See Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 22 (statement of Janice
Hopkins Tanne, President, American Society of Journalists and Authors) (supporting
the proposed distribution right amendment); id. at 9 (statement of Paul Aiken on
behalf of the Authors League of America) (declaring that the Working Group's pro-
posals "provide an effective framework for the on-line protection of copyrights").
172. See Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 63 (statement of Robert Hadl,
Vice President and General Counsel, MCA) ("[It is critical that the law protect
posed amendment is categorized as a clarification of existing case law or
an expansion of their rights, content providers still believe that the
amendment is necessary to resolve any uncertainty.'73 Without such a
resolution, content providers believe that they will lose their ability to
enforce their copyrights on the NI.' 4
Opponents of the proposal are concerned that it will greatly expand
the rights of copyright owners without considering the rights of the pub-
lic.'75 Existing statutes have proven flexible enough to give copyright
owners the right to control digital transmissions.'76 Even without the
proposed expansion, the courts in Playboy and Sega held that copyright
owners' rights were violated on digital networks, although no material
object changed hands."' Moreover, the proposed amendment of
§ 106(3) would do nothing to change § 101, which defines "copies" or
"phonorecords" as "material objects."' 8 Therefore, the proposed
amendment would not actually rectify the unique distribution problems
caused by digital transmissions.
Furthermore, the amendment would restrict users' rights by making all
public transmissions fall within the exclusive distribution right of the
copyright owner.79 This restriction would greatly change, not merely
copyright owners against such electronic distribution systems to the same extent that
distributions of hard copies are protected today.").
173. See Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 40 (statement of Edward
Murphy, President and CEO, National Music Publishers Association) (stating that an
amendment is necessary to clarify the law and extend the distribution right to the
NI); Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 48 (statement of Ann Harkins, Co-
Director, Creative Incentive Coalition) (endorsing amendment but noting their belief
that transmissions are reproductions under current law); id. at 73 (statement of Wil-
liam Ellis, Washington Intellectual Property Counsel, IBM, on behalf of the Computer
Business Equipment Manufacturers Association) (supporting the amendment as clarifi-
cation of existing law rather than a new right).
174. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the need for the
implementation of adequate copyright protections in the NIl).
175. See Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 59-60 (statement of Robert
Oakley, Library Director and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, on
behalf of the American Association of Law Libraries) (arguing for consideration of
the rights of users).
176. See Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 51-52 (statement of Nel
Smith, Attorney, Limbok & Limbok) (noting courts that have found transmission impli-
cate digital property rights even without a transmission amendment); Working Group
Hearing III, supra note 4, at 53 (statement of Gary Shapiro, Chairman, Home Re-
cording Rights Coalition) ("[C]urrent law [is] sufficient to impose liability for infring-
ing transmissions as a violation of the distribution right.").
177. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993);
Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also su-
pra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (discussing Playboy); supra notes 144-60 and
accompanying text (discussing Sega).
178. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
179. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 33 (statement of Gloria Werner,
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clarify, existing law."n For example, the broadcasting of movies over
the NII is a transmission.' Currently, movie transmissions implicate
the public performance and public display rights. 2 As proposed, the
amendment would expand digital transmission rights by giving movie
copyright owners the right to control not only public performances and
public displays, but all transmissions as distributions of the work as
well." Thus, the amendment would indirectly repeal limitations on the
performance and display rights, thereby expanding the rights of copyright
owners without considering the detrimental impact on user access."
The proposed amendment to the exclusive distribution right may not
pass the balancing test, which is essential to satisfy the constitutional
purpose of fostering the progress of science and the arts." This change
is not needed to protect content providers because existing case law
already provides that digital transmissions without a physical transfer
implicate the distribution right." Moreover, the amendment does not
codify this case law, as the Working Group suggests, because it does not
address the "material object" requirement of § 101. Rather, the amend-
ment addresses only the method of distribution element of § 106(3). '8
Furthermore, the expansion of the rights of copyright owners caused by
this amendment may not promote, but may in fact inhibit, the dissemina-
tion of information to the public.'"
University Librarian, UCLA, on behalf of the Association of Research Librarians). In
its final report, the Working Group states that "not all transmissions of copies of
copyrighted works will fall within the copyright owner's exclusive distribution right."
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 215. Yet, the Working Group does not
explain how courts will make such a distinction using its proposed amendment.
180. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 33 (statement of Gloria Werner,
University Librarian, UCLA, on behalf of the Association of Research Librarians);
Samuelson, supra note 81, at 22-23.
181. Samuelson, supra note 81, at 23.
182. Id.
183. Id. But see Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 62-63 (statement of
Robert Hadl, Vice President and General Counsel, MCA) (stating that distribution of
movies via the NH may take the place of purchasing videos in stores).
184. Samuelson, supra note 81, at 23.
185. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 133-66 and accompanying text
187. See supra notes 133, 170, 179 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
4. A Proposal to Protect the Distribution Right
An amendment to codify the result in Playboy and Sega would be
beneficial to preserve the distribution right on the NII without enlarging
its scope. Such an amendment would modify the definitions of "copy"
and "phonorecord" to clarify that digital transmissions, not just material
objects, are distributed. Section 101, as amended, would read:
"Copies" are material objects or transmissions, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term "copies" includes the
material object or transmission, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is
first fixed.
"Phonorecords" are material objects or transmissions, in which sounds, other
than those accompanying a motion picture or audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. The term "phonorecords" includes the material object or
transmission in which the sounds are first fixed."
With these modifications, content providers will be assured of the same
control over the distribution of works both on and off the NIL. Further-
more, NII users will not be unfairly deprived of their existing rights to
information by an expansion of the content providers' distribution rights.
This proposed amendment preserves the balance originally envisioned by
the Framers of the Constitution, while overcoming obstacles created by
digital transmissions.
5. The First Sale Doctrine
The first sale doctrine, which derives from the common law principle
against restraints on alienation of property,"9° limits the exclusive distri-
bution right by allowing "the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord ... without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.""9'
Following a sale or other transfer, the new owner can then distribute or
display the copy that he owns without liability to the copyright own-
er." The copyright owner still retains the reproduction, performance,
189. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (italics proposed by author).
190. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.N. 2898, 2899.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
192. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDcIARY, H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94 Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693 (explaining the first sale exclu-
sion).
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and adaptation rights in both the original work and the transferred cop-
ies."
New owners are somewhat restricted in their right to alienate sound
recordings and computer programs." A new owner can sell or give
away, but may not rent, lease, or lend, a sound recording or computer
program for commercial gain.' 95 Sound recording distributions are con-
trolled by the Record Rental Amendment of 1984,"96 and computer pro-
gram distributions are regulated by the Computer Software Rental
Amendments Act of 1989.1
97
The Record Rental Amendment (RRA) "cover[s] transactions which
common sense indicates are equivalent to rentals, but which may be dis-
guised in an attempt to avoid liability under the law."98 The RRA is a
response to the detestable, but lawful, practices of record rental busi-
nesses, which threatened the record industry." Record rental business-
es discouraged consumers from purchasing records by posting ads such
as "never, ever buy another record," and encouraged them to copy the
records illegally by selling blank cassette tapes at their front coun-
ters." Therefore, in order to protect the sales of the record business
and the rights of the copyrights owners, Congress enacted the RRA.2"'
The Computer Rental Amendment (CRA), modeled after the RRA,
addresses a similar problem-lawful rental of computer software that
193. See id.; Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 280 (4th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the first sale exclusion does not apply to the performance
right); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.
1988) (maintaining that the sale of a book does not transfer derivative works right to
the new owner); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63 (3d
Cir. 1986) (stating that the transfer of ownership of a copy does not affect a copy-
right owner's exclusive performance right); Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug,
Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (explaining that the purchaser of a work
has the right to dispose of his copy but not to make additional copies of the work).
194. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994).
195. Id.
196. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2898-99.
197. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 265, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990);
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
198. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. 2898, 2901.
199. Id. at 1-2.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see also SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 265, supra note 197,
at 3 (explaining the underlying rationale of the RRA).
resulted in unauthorized reproduction. 2 The CRA exception is "nar-
rowly drafted""3 to prevent rental-type transactions because
"[c]omputer software, unlike video cassettes, does not generally lend it-
self to casual enjoyment during a short rental period,"2" but, more like-
ly, lends itself to unauthorized copying.2"5 The RRA and CRA are de-
signed to protect vulnerable industries from commercial rentals when
consumers have the primary purpose of illegally reproducing the works
and such rentals have the primary effect of displacing legitimate
sales."
a. Analysis of the application of the first sale doctrine to the NII
The Working Group asserts that it is "clear that the first sale model...
should not apply with respect to distribution by transmission."2 7 Ac-
cording to the Working Group, the first sale exception should not apply
in the NII context because transmissions always involve both a reproduc-
tion and a distribution.2" Further, the Working Group states that re-
straints on the first sale doctrine, i.e., the CRA and RRA, are Congressio-
nal responses to technological advances that allow reproductions to be
made more easily, less expensively, and with better quality, resulting in a
need for greater protection of copyright owners." This rationale ap-
plies equally, if not more so, to digital transmissions.210 In its draft re-
port, the Working Group recommended that § 109 of the Copyright Act
be amended to disallow all disposals of a work, following the first sale,
202. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 265, supra note 197, at 4; see
also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 96, n.7 (3d Cir. 1991)
(discussing the problem of applying the first sale doctrine to computer programs).
203. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 197, at 3.
204. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 265, supra note 197, at 3.
205. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 265, supra note 197, at 2; HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 197, at 1.
206. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 265, supra note 197, at 4-5;
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 197, at 3; see also
Central Point Software, Inc. v. Global Software & Accessories, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 957
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (first reported case applying the CRA).
207. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 95; WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra
note 20, at 124.
208. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 95; WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra
note 20, at 54, 124. When the first sale doctrine allows a copy holder to both repro-
duce and distribute a work digitally without legal repercussions, one article claims,
the holder is given "the copyright equivalent of a license to print money." David
Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, The Information Infrastructure, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16,
1994, at 12.
209. WORING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 91; WORING GROUP DRAFr, supra
note 20, at 55.
210. WORING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 91; WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra
note 20, at 55.
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by transmission.2 ' In its final report, the Working Group withdrew this
statutory proposal. Apparently, it found that such an amendment was
unnecessary because "the language of the Copyright Act, the legislative
history and case law make clear that the [first sale] doctrine is applicable
only to those situations where the owner of a particular copy disposes of
physical possession of that particular copy.
"211
A thorough analysis of the entire legislative history of the CRA and
RRA reveals that these amendments were enacted not just because illegal
reproductions were easier and cheaper to make, but because the growth
of the rental industry and the rise of technological advances threatened
to destroy the record and computer industries."4 Congress passed the
CRA and RRA because the primary effect of record and software rentals
was to encourage infringing reproductions." 5 Unlike record and soft-
ware rentals, the anticipated effect of NII transmissions is not to infringe
on the copyright owner's reproduction rights.2" The NIl's primary goal,
as the Clinton Administration recognizes, is to provide copyright owners
with greater opportunities to exploit their rights and provide users with
greater access to information-thereby promoting the progress of society
as a whole, particularly in science and the useful arts."7
In concluding that it is clear that the first sale model (where a hard
copy changes hands) does not apply to distribution by transmission
(where no hard copy is transferred), the Working Group assumes that a
transmission will always be both a reproduction and a distribution.2"8
As Terry Southwick, a member of the Working Group, explained at the
preliminary hearings:
Our intention with the amendment to the first sale doctrine was simply to clarify
that further distributions that are available to consumers under the first sale doc-
trine would not include distribution by transmission, since they would not be part-
211. WORING GROUP DRAFT, supra note 20, at 124-25.
212. WORKaNG GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 90-95.
213. Id. at 92.
214. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 987, supra note 190; SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
S. REP. No. 265, supra note 197; HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 735,
supra note 197.
215. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 14-19, 34 and accompanying text.
217. Id.
218. WORICNG GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 95; WORKING GROUP DRAFT, supra
note 20, at 39, 54, 124.
ing with the copy they received. When they further transmit it, they would be
retaining a copy, and therefore, the first sale doctrine would not apply.""
In its final report, the Working Group rejected the notion that a transmit-
ter could send a copy of a work to a receiver and, at or near the same
time, erase the first copy. 2° The Working Group noted that because a
reproduction undoubtedly takes place in such a situation, an exception
of this sort "would vitiate the reproduction right."22" ' Others argue that
this, in effect, is the equivalent of a digital copy "changing hands. " 2'
Practically and logically, the first sale doctrine should still apply to such
transfers of digital property. 3
Eventually, distribution by NII transmission could replace the tradition-
al way that copyrighted materials are bought, sold, and exchanged. 4 If
so, then exclusion of the first sale doctrine, for technological or legal
reasons, in the digital environment could result in exclusion of the first
sale doctrine altogether, a result which is both unfair and unwarranted.
The first sale doctrine reflects a fundamental right of property own-
ers-the free alienation of their property.22 Without the first sale exclu-
sion, copyright owners could monopolize alttransmission of information,
not just initial distributions, and new owners could not digitally transfer
property that they rightfully own.226 Modifications in technology should
219. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 53-54 (statement of Terry
Southwick, Attorney, United States Patent & Trademark Office).
220. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 93-94; see Comments of Neil
Netanel & Mark Lemley, Assistant Professors of Law, University of Texas School of
Law, to Terry Southwick, Attorney-Advisor, Office of Legis. & Int'l Affairs, U.S. Pat &
Trademark Off., at *1-2 (Sept. 2, 1994) (visited Dec. 1, 1996) <gopher.//sunbird.usd.edu
or http://www.wwa.com> (describing the two different transmission scenarios).
221. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 94.
222. Id.; Comments of Arthur Rubin, Ph.D, to U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., at *1
(Aug. 23, 1994) <gopher/sunbird.usd.edu or http://www.wwa.com> (distinguishing
between distribution-by-transmission and transfer-by-transmission).
223. Netanel & Lemley, supra note 220, at *2; Rubin, supra note 222, at *1.
224. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 53 (statement of Gary Shapiro,
Chairman, Home Recording Rights Coalition); id. at 56 (statement of Allan Arlow,
President and CEO, Computer and Communications Industry Association).
225. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, H.R. REP. No. 987, supra note 198, at 2.
226. Comments of Mary Brandt Jensen, Professor of Law & Director of Law Library
Operations, University of South Dakota, to Terry Southwick, Attorney-Advisor, Office
of Legis. & Int'l Affairs, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., at *14 (Aug, 26, 1994) (visited
Dec. 1, 1996) <gopher:-lsunbird.usd.edu or http://www.wwa.com>. Software owners
have previously tried to gain such a monopoly and eliminate the first sale exclusion
by putting "shrinkwrap licenses" on their software. Id. The enforceability of
shrinkwrap licenses, however, has become highly suspect. Id. Those cases that have
considered shrinkwrap licenses have found them to be unenforceable as either con-
tracts of adhesion or as mere proposals to an existing contract under the UCC. See
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 98-103 (3d Cir. 1991),
(holding that shrinkwrap provisions, which are governed by the UCC, are material
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not divest users of the basic right to share their own property, the "ratio-
nale behind the first sale doctrine itself," 7 because the first sale doc-
trine supports sound public poicy.
2 1
b. A proposed alternative amendment to the first sale doctrine
Rather than completely discounting the first sale doctrine on the NII, a
limited adaptation of § 109 would protect the vested rights of content
providers and users alike.' By clarifying the definition of "otherwise
dispose," the first sale doctrine could easily be adapted to the NIT envi-
ronment. In doing so, the statute would readily identify digital transac-
tions that traditionally and justifiably qualify for first sale exclusions.
This would guarantee content providers the same protections that they
enjoy in traditional environments. The proposed amendment would read:
(a) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of
a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright own-
er, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
(2) "Otherwise dispose," as used in subsection (a)(1) and applied
to transmissions does not include transmissions wherein a copy is both retained
by the transmitter and received by the transmittee."
Under this proposed amendment, if a user both keeps a copy
of the work and sends a copy to another person, the user repro-
duces but does not "otherwise dispose" of the work. On the other
hand, if a user "transfers" a copy to another person, by transmit-
alterations of the contract and must be expressly accepted to be enforceable); Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding district
court's decision that shrinkwrap license was unenforceable as a contract of adhe-
sion); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 770 (D. Ariz.
1993) (adopting the rationale of Step-Saver and holding that shrinkwrap provisions
were unenforceable). For further analysis of shrinkwrap licenses and provisions, see
Lloyd L. Rich, Mass Market Software and the Shrinkwrap License, 23 COLO. LAW.
1321 (1994), and Fred M. Greguras & Sandy J. Wong, Software Licensing Comple-
ments the Digital Age, 11 COMPUTER LAW. 15 (1994).
227. Jensen, supra note 226, at *6-7.
228. See Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 24 (statement of Alfred Wil-
lis on behalf of the Art Library Society of North America) (criticizing the Working
Group's proposal as "a gutting of copyrights benefits to the public"); Samuelson, su-
pra note 81, at 24 (finding the Working Group's rationale for eliminating first sale on
the Nil unpersuasive).
229. See Samuelson, supra note 81, at 24 (advocating a "narrower approach" to
changing the first sale doctrine).
230. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) (italics proposed by author).
ting it without retaining the original copy, the user "otherwise
disposes" of the work. In the first situation, the user would not
be protected by the first sale doctrine and would be liable to the
copyright owner for the reproduction; in the second situation, the
first sale doctrine would apply and the user would be absolved
from copyright infringement liability. This proposal upholds the
longstanding rights of copyright owners and information users,
thereby achieving a "Pareto optimal" result.
B. The Reproduction Right
Section 106(1) grants a copyright owner the exclusive right "to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."u
The reproduction right is subject to only a few statutory exclu-
sions, of which only two, fair use'c and library and archive re-
production,' limit the reproduction right in all types of works.
Several other statutes provide more limited exclusions to the re-
production right for specific works, such as making single copies
of ephemeral recordings,' requiring compulsory licenses for
reproduction and distribution of nondramatic musical works,'
and allowing copying for computer program utilization and ar-
chiving.' Furthermore, under the Audio Home Recording Act,
consumers are allowed to reproduce digital sound recordings for
home use without infringement liability, although there is a levy
231. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
232. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The fair use exclusion provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple cop-
ies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole;
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted
work.
Id.
233. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994). This exclusion allows a library or archive to make one
copy of a work for security and preservation purposes. Id.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
235. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994).
236. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
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imposed on the sale of recording devices and media to compen-
sate copyright owners. 7
1. The Working Group's Analysis of the Reproduction Right
on the NII
On the NII, all exclusive rights are overshadowed by the repro-
duction right, because most, if not all, NI transactions will in-
volve the reproduction right.2' The Working Group gives the
following illustrations of network functions which implicate the
reproduction right:
* When a work is placed into a computer, whether on a disk, diskette, ROM,
or other storage device or in RAM for more than a very brief period, a copy is
made;'
0 When a printed work is "scanned" into a digital file, a copy-the digital file
itself-is made;2'
* When other works--including photographs, motion pictures, or sound re-
cordings--are digitized, copies are made;24
0 Whenever a digitized file is "uploaded" from a user's computer, to a (BBS)
or other server, a copy is made;242
0 Whenever a digitized file is "downloaded" from a BBS or other server, a
copy is made;4 3
* When a file is transferred from one computer network user to another,
multiple copies are generally made.2 4
237. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1994).
238. WORKING GRoup REPORT, supra note 42, at 64; WORKING GROUP DRAFT, supra
note 20, at 35-36.
239. In support of this conclusion, the Working Group states that "[ilt has long
been clear under U.S. law that the placement of copyrighted material into a
computer's memory is a reproduction of that material." WORKING GROUP REPORT, sU-
pra note 42, at 65; see WORKING GRoup DRAFr, supra note 20, at 36.
240. WORKING GROUP REPORT, sWpra note 42, at 65.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 66.
243. Id.
244. This fact makes the application of the first sale doctrine in the Ni context
problematic. Even if the first sale still were to apply to distributions via the NI, the
first sale doctrine does not apply to reproductions. Because a copy must be made to
"transfer" a file from one computer to another, copyright owners will still be able to
sue users for violation of the reproduction right when the users exercise their first
sale. In absence of other statutory protections or licenses, this reproduction would
render the first sale right useless. See supra notes 207-28 and accompanying text
(analyzing the application of the first sale doctrine of the Nil).
o Under current technology, when an end-user's computer is employed as a
"dumb" terminal to access a file resident on another computer such as a BBS or
Internet host, a copy of at least the portion viewed is made in the user's comput-
er. Without such copying into the RAM or buffer of the user's computer, no
screen display would be possible."'5 As long as the amount viewed is more than
de minimis, it is an infringement unless authorized or specifically exempt. 46
Thus, even the common act of browsing, which is not normally consid-
ered a trespass of copyright, could violate an owner's reproduction right
on the NIL.247
Currently, the statutory definition of "transmit" does not expressly
include the reproduction right.2 48 As shown above in the Working
Group's illustrations, transmissions do, in fact, involve the reproduction
of a work. 49 Therefore, the Working Group recommends that the defi-
nition of "transmit" be amended to include the reproduction right.2" In
its draft report, the Working Group proposed a "primary purpose and
effect" test to distinguish between transactions that are reproductions
and those that are performance or displays.25" ' In the NII context, the
Working Group encouraged the use of the reproduction right, instead of
the other exclusive rights, because there are more limited exceptions im-
posed and there are fewer infringement defenses available to users.252
245. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 66; WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra
note 20, at 37.
246. WORKING GROUP DRAFT, supra note 20, at 37.
247. WORING GROUP DRAFT, supra note 20, at 36. The Working Group Report notes
that simply because "copying has occurred does not necessarily mean that in-
fringement has occurred." WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 65 n.203. When
copying is authorized, defensible under fair use, otherwise statutorily exempt, or de
minimis, there is no liability because the user can assert one or more of these claims
as an affirmative defense. Id.
248. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Under this statute, "[t]o 'transmit' a performance or dis-
play is to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are
received beyond the place from which they are sent." Id.
249. See supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text (setting forth instances when a
network function implicates the reproduction right).
250. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 217; WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra
note 20, at 122. This amendment does not appear to be controversial as it merely
reflects that because of computer and digital technology, transmissions are no longer
just performances or displays, but may also be reproductions.
251. WORKING GROUP DRAFT, supra note 20, at 122. The Working Group's proposed
amendment reads:
To "transmit" a performance or display is to communicate it by any device
or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from
which they are sent. To "transmit" a reproduction is to distribute it by any
device or process whereby a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed be-
yond the place from which it was sent.
WORKING GROUP REPORTr, supra note 42, at app. 2.
252. WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra note 20, at 39; see supra notes 231-37 and ac-
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In its final report, the Working Group withdrew its proposed statutory
"primary purpose and effect" test, thereby admonishing the courts to
clear up any confusion regarding whether a transaction is a reproduction,
a performance, or a display.2" The final report still supports the idea
that courts could employ the test in their analysis on a case-by-case ba-
sis, instead of as a statutory mandate.2" Even without codification of
the "primary purpose and effect" test, the Working Group's final plan will
ensure that virtually every transmissiol of a work across the NII will in-
volve the exclusive right to copy and a potential infringement of that
right.255
2. The Content Providers' View of the Reproduction Right
Content providers support the Working Group's proposal to amend the
definition of "transmit" to include reproduction,2" but are very critical
of the "primary purpose and effect" test.257 Content providers foresee
several advantages in proceeding through the reproduction right, rather
than other exclusive rights: (1) the issue of whether there has been a
public distribution, display, or performance, or merely a private one is
companying text (discussing the reproduction right).
253. See WORMNG GRouP REPORr, supra note 42, at 217-18.
254. Id. at 218.
255. But see Comments of Bill Sohl to Terry Southwick, Attorney-Advisor, Office of
Legis. & Int'l Affairs, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., at *1 (Sept 7, 1994) (visited Dec.
12, 1996) <gopherJ//sunbird.usd.edu or http://www.wwa.com> (suggesting Internet trans-
actions may not be infringing because most "Internet activity is authorized under an
'implied license' to copy").
256. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 62 (statement of Robert Hadl,
Vice President and General Counsel, MCA); Working Group Hearing III, supra note
4, at 48-49 (statement of Ann Harkins, Co-Director, Creative Incentive Coalition).
257. See Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 54 (statement of Neil Smith,
Attorney, Limbok & Limbok) (pointing out that the primary purpose and effect test is
muddy and difficult to apply); Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 49
(statement of Ann Harkins, Co-Director, Creative Incentive Coalition) (advising the
Working Group to further analyze the primary purpose and effect test because "it is
kind of an ad hoc subjective analysis"); Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at
24 (statement of Robert Steinberg, Intellectual Property Counsel, Times-Mirror Co.)
(criticizing the primary purpose and effect test because it creates an either/or propo-
sition, when more than one right may apply); Working Group Hearing IV, supra note
4, at 41 (statement of Edward Murphy, President and CEO, National Music Publishers
Association) (stating NMPA's belief that the primary purpose and effect test would
"create havoc rather than certainty"); infra notes 314-33 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing further the primary purpose and effect test).
avoided; (2) the definition of publication will not have to be changed, so
there are no consequences on mandatory deposit requirements; (3) repro-
duction does not fall under the limitations of the first sale doctrine; and
(4) international enforcement will be easier because there is international
consensus on reproduction rights, but not on distribution rights.2"
3. Does Reading a Work into RAM Implicate the Reproduction Right?
In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., the court held that
a copy is created, for purposes of copyright violation, when software is
loaded into a computer's Random Access Memory (RAM).2 "° MAI, a
computer and software manufacturing company, sued Peak, a computer
servicing company, for infringement of MAI's reproduction right in its
operating system software.26 ' Peak, in order to diagnose and service
computers that were manufactured by MAI, turned on their customer's
computers, an act which loaded MAI's operating software into the RAM
of those computers.262 To support its infringement claim, MAI asserted
that loading the software into the RAM was an unauthorized reproduc-
tion because its licensing agreement prohibited third parties, such as
Peak, from using or copying the software.6 3 In defense, Peak argued
that loading the software into the computers' RAM was not a copyright
violation "because the 'copy' created in RAM is not 'fixed.'"'26 The court
rejected this argument, concluding that a copy made into RAM is suffi-
ciently "fixed" and therefore held Peak liable for making unauthorized
reproductions of the software onto the RAM.2"
258. Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 6 (statement of Steven Metalitz,
General Counsel, Information Industry Association).
259. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
260. Id. at 519; accord Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 363-64 (E.D. Va. 1994) (relying on the analysis of MAI to reach the same
conclusion based on nearly identical facts); Triad Sys. Co. v. Southeastern Express
Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1239, 1242-44 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding MAI indistinguishable from
the facts of the case at bar).
261. MAI, 991 F.2d at 513-16. The complaint against Peak alleged covert "copyright
infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, trademark infringement, false advertis-
ing, and unfair competition." Id. at 513.
262. Id. at 518.
263. Id. at 517. The licensing agreement did allow Peak's customers, the licensees,
to use the software, which necessarily requires loading the software into the RAM,
but prohibited third parties from doing so. Id.
264. Id. at 518. In order to establish a violation of the reproduction right, a "copy"
must be created. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994). Furthermore, in order to constitute a
"copy", the copy must be "fixed." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Fixation requires that the
work "is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." Id.
265. MAI, 991 F.2d at 518-19. To support this conclusion, the court relied on a
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Although there is some support for the conclusion that reading a work
into RAM is a "copy," this view is not well-settled.2' In fact, the recent
cases of MAI,267 Advanced Computer Services v. MAI Systems
Corp.,268 and Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co. 21 may
rely on an incorrect interpretation of copyright law. ° Professor Litman
argues that the courts' interpretation in these cases is incorrect because
"reading a work into a computer's [RAM] is too transitory to create a
reproduction" under § 106(1).21 "A work's appearance in RAM is, by its
nature, temporary; the work will disappear from RAM when the comput-
er is turned off."" Therefore, she concludes, reading a work into a
computer's RAM should be considered a display, not a reproduction.273
To support this conclusion, Professor Litman relies on the following
quote from the legislative history of the reproduction right:
"Reproduction" under clause (1) of section 106 is to be distinguished from
"display" under clause (5). For a work to be "reproduced," its fixation in tangible
form must be "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."
statement from Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621
(C.D. Cal. 1984). The Apple Computer court stated:
RAM can be simply defined as a computer component in which data and
computer programs can be temporarily recorded. Thus, the purchaser of
[software] desiring to utilize in his computer all of the programs on the dis-
kette could arrange to copy [the software] into RAM. This would only be a
temporary fixation. It is a property of RAM that when the computer is
turned off, the copy of the program recorded in RAM is lost.
Id. at 622 (emphasis added). However, the MA/ court glossed over the temporary na-
ture of RAM recognized by Apple Computer and summarily concluded that a "copy
made in RAM is 'fixed.'" MA.!, 991 F.2d at 519.
266. In contrast to the Working Group's conclusion, Professor Litman asserts that it
has not "long been clear under U.S. law" that placement of work into computer's
memory is a reproduction. Litman, supra note 81, at 41-42. In fact, only three cases,
all decided in the past three years, have reached the conclusion that placing a work
into RAM is a reproduction. See supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
267. MAI, 991 F.2d at 511.
268. 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994)..
269. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 64 F.3d
1330 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996).
270. See Samuelson, supra note 81, at 23 (arguing "[tihis is a questionable interpre-
tation of current law"); Litnan, supra note 81, at 41 (arguing that this characteriza-
tion of copyright law is "dubious").
271. Litman, supra note 81, at 41.
272. Id. at 41 n.57.
273. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 67 (statement of Jessica Litman).
Thus, the showing of images on a screen or tube would not be a violation of
clause (1), although it might come within the scope of clause (5)." 4
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Copyright Act shows a differ-
ent interpretation of the fixation requirement than was given by these
cases.75 "[Tihe definition of fixation would exclude from the concept
purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected
briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode
ray tube, or captured momentarily in the 'memory' of a computer."2 7 6
4. Creating an Avenue for Noninfringing Use of the
Information Superhighway
Although case law supports the notion that reading a work into a
computer's RAM is an actionable reproduction, a closer look at the histo-
of the Copyright Act reaches a much different conclusion.277 It is not
unreasonable to rely on the binding impact of the MAI cases, as they an!
the few cases that directly address this issue. Therefore, the true issue to
be addressed is the propriety of the result of these cases. If all copying
into a computer's RAM is actionable, then any act of browsing, viewing,
or reading the work on a computer screen would expose an NII user to
infringement liability.278 Browsing or reading a work is not an infringe-
ment of copyright, nor should it be.27 Therefore, even if "browsing"
works on the NII is technically a violation of the reproduction right, the
law should be changed because "it is simply not fair." '
If this characterization of reproduction is allowed, then users will be
unable to browse NII information without liability or, at the least, they
will be required to prove a defense."' This will both inhibit research
and discussion among those who use the NII and defeat the primary goal
of making information more accessible.'s Furthermore, this will give
copyright owners "truly monopolistic control over access to copyrighted
274. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JuDIcIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 48, at 62, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5675. The display right, unlike the reproduction right,
limits the copyright owner's control to public displays and only applies to certain
types of works. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1994).
275. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JuDiciARY, H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 48 at 53, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5666. See supra notes 259-60 for case citations.
276. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDicIARy, H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 48, at 53, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5666 (emphasis added).
277. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text
278. Litman, supra note 81, at 4.
279. Samuelson, supra note 81, at 22.
280. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 18 (statement of Sandra Walker,
President, Visual Resources Association).
281. Id. (statement of Sandra Walker, President, Visual Resources Association).
282. Id. (statement of Sandra Walker, President, Visual Resources Association).
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works in the electronic environment." ' Such control will discourage
the use of information, which is antithetical to the mission of copyright
law and the goals of the NII.
a. A proposed browsing exception
In order to create an avenue for noninfringing use of the Information
Superhighway, a statutory exception for "browsing" may need to be cre-
ated. Under such an exception, the law could distinguish between merely
copying the work onto RAM for viewing purposes and copying the work
onto the computer's hard drive, floppy disk, or printer for reproduction
purposes.' This exception would permit users to ride the NII without
the constant threat of copyright liability.' Furthermore, content pro-
viders could maintain their existing right of exclusive reproduction with-
out being given "monopolistic control" over all NII uses.'
283. Comments of Mary Brandt Jensen, supra note 226, at *14.
284. The following is a possible draft of such an exception:
§ 121. Limitations on exclusive rights: Temporary or Random Access Memo-
ry displays
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(1), it is not an in-
fringement of a copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted
work when a copy is made into a computer's temporary or Random Access
Memory for the sole purpose of display or browsing.
(2) The exclusion under this section does not apply when a copyright-
ed work is copied from a computer's temporary or Random Access Memory
onto other memory functions of the computer, such as a hard disk drive or
floppy diskette, or when a work is further copied from a computer's Ran-
dom Access Memory .for the purpose of distribution or reproduction
Proposed by author.
285. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
286. This exclusion would not prevent a copyright owner from asserting a claim for
reproduction infringement when a work is "scanned" into a computer, much like a
photocopying machine is used today. For example, this exclusion, standing alone,
would not have excused the actions of Newsday in a recent lawsuit; in that case,
FPG alleged that Newsday had scanned FPG's copyrighted photos into a computer,
and then re-used portions of them as part of a front page montage. FPG Int'l v.
Newsday, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. settled Oct. 31, 1994). Nor would it excuse
reproductions which are analogous to photocopying-where a copy is made and inte-
grated into another work, or for further use. For examples of where the reproduction
right has been violated by photocopying, see American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995), Princeton
Univ. Press, Inc. v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Mich.
1994), or Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
An exception of this type is not unprecedented. 7 Section 117 of the
Copyright Act allows an owner of a computer program to make a copy
of that program provided that "such a new copy or adaptation is created
as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in con-
junction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner."' The
drafters of this section recognized that the special problems posed by
computers could not, at that time, be solved by a "definitive legislative
solution," and therefore preserved the status quo until the Commission
on New Technological Uses could recommend a provision.' The pres-
ervation of the status quo, the right to browse, and the special problems
posed by Nil technology also justify this proposed exclusion.
Furthermore, recent case law provides some authority that allows
"intermediate copying" in order to extract the underlying ideas from the
computer programsY In Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,"'
the court held that interim copying of computer programs constituted
fair use.' The court identified a unique problem with computer pro-
grams: they are distributed in object code which precludes public access
to their underlying ideas and concepts unless they are disassembled. ',
The court determined that without a fair use determination that allowed
for reproduction, copyright owners of these computer programs would
be conferred "a de facto monopoly" over ideas-a "result [which] defeats
the fundamental purpose of the Copyright Act."2" In the case of NIl
transmissions, reproduction is required to simply view a work on the
NUl. 5 Without a statutory right to browse akin to interim copying,
copyright owners will also gain a "de facto" monopoly over the underly-
ing ideas in their works.'
b. A proposed archiving exception
In addition to a browsing exception, the copyright law may need to
officially recognize the common, and necessary, practice of making back-
up copies of electronic files to safeguard against technological
failures. 7 Presently, owners of computer programs are entitled to
287. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1994).
288. Id.
289. HOuSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 48, at 116,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5731.
290. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
291. Id. at 1520.
292. Id. at 1527-28.
293. Id. at 1527.
294. Id.
295. WORING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 66.
296. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text (discussing copyright infringe-.
ment for works scanned onto computers).
297. Comments of Billy Barron, to the U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., at *1 (Sept. 6,
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make copies for archival purposes. 8 Section 117 specifically allows for
backup copying of computer programs themselves, but not of the under-
lying electronic files.' This distinction is unreasonable."° Under the
current statute, there could be an argument that archiving electronic files
does not qualify as fair use, because fair use copying on computers is
already covered by § 117 and does not include copying of electronic files,
only the computer programs themselves. If so, then users trying to safe-
guard their own files could be liable for infringing the reproduction right,
without a fair use defense available to them. Thus, an amendment to al-
low for archiving of electronic files is sensible."'
C. The Performance Right
The Copyright Act also grants to copyright owners of literature, music,
drama, choreographs, pantomimes, motion pictures, and audiovisuals the
exclusive right to publicly perform works.' In the traditional arena,
sound recordings are statutorily excluded from the performance right'
1994) (visited Dec. 1, 1996) <gopher//sunbird.usd.edu or http://www.wwacom>.
298. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
299. Comments of Bruce Hayden, to the U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., at *2 (visited
Dec. 1, 1996) <gopher.//sunbird.usd.edu or http://www.wwacom>.
300. Id.
301. Such an amendment could read:
§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs and electronic files
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program or an electronic file to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that com-
puter program provided:
(1) that such new copy or adaptation of a computer program is created
as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner.
(2) that such new copy or adaptation of either a computer program or
an electronic file is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies
are destroyed in the event that the continued possession of the computer
program or the electronic file should cease to be rightful.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994) (italics proposed by author).
302. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994).
303. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1994). FNen in the absence of a performance right, record
companies may still be able to protect the performance of their entire album under
the compilation right. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). See Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc.
v. Ashley Publications, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding that selection
and grouping of musical works in a book is entitled to copyright protection); NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 115, § 8.14[A].
and musical works are subject to some statutory licensing require-
ments.' The definitions of § 101 provide that:
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either di-
rectly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompanying it audible.'"
To perform or display a work "publicly" means-(1) to perform or display it at
a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the perfor-
mance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the
same time or at different times.w
Newly passed legislation also allows for a public performance right for
sound recordings in the digital context."7 Thus, in order to exercise the
performance right, a copyright owner must show that the type of work
owned qualifies for the exclusive right, that the manner in which the
work has been performed is included in the statute, and that the location
of the performance is considered to be public.'
1. The Working Group's Recommendations
A main benefit of the NII is that it can be used as a conduit for all
types of transactions, including sales, rentals, and presentations."
While there is one basic vehicle for conducting these transactions, digital
transmissions, there are several privileges that can be asserted as a re-
sult."' The performance right has specific requirements that must be
satisfied in order for a copyright owner to exercise exclusivity." Thus,
"[a] distinction must be made" between NII transmissions that are copies
304. In addition to compulsory licensing for reproductions and distributions dis-
cussed in the text accompanying note 235, supra, musical works are also subject to
statutory licensing for jukebox performances. 17 U.S.C. §§ 116-117 (1994).
305. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
306. Id.
307. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-39,
Nov. 1, 1995, 109 Stat 336 (amending portions of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106, 111, 114-115,
119, 801-803).
308. As defined by case law, "public" is a broad term that would likely include NI
transactions wherein several separate users view the performance at the same time in
different locations. See, e.g., On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that public performance occurred
when movies were broadcast into several hotel rooms from central unit).
309. WORICNG GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 53-54.
310. Id. at 217-18.
311. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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and those that are performances or displays.' 2 In order to make this
crucial distinction, the Working Group proposes an amendment to the
definition of "transmit," which reads in pertinent part:
To "transmit" a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which
they are sent.
To 'transmit" a reproduction is to distribute it by any device or process whereby
a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond the place from which it was
sent..
31
Originally, the proposed amendment included a "primary purpose and
effect" test that would have required an analysis of the intent of the
transmitter and of the receiver at the time of the transmission.3 14 The
Working Group excluded this specific test from the final draft and decid-
ed to leave this determination to the courts to be resolved on a case-by-
case basis.3 '
Congress recently passed legislation, supported by the Working Group
and the Clinton Administration, that established a performance right for
sound recordings in the digital context.3 ' "[Ilnteractive digital
technology threatens to blur the line between the performance and the
distribution of sound recordings."' 7 With the improved quality afforded
by digital taping,' consumers may choose to record their favorite artists
from digital audio services, or "celestial jukebox[es]," which could de-
crease music sales.3 ' Thus, the recently passed legislation was consid-
ered essential to protect the livelihood of sound recording artists."9
Without the new legislation, an "historical anomaly" in the Copyright Act,
which specifically excludes a performance right for sound recordings and
312. WORKING GROuP RiEPoirr, supra note 42, at 71; WORING GROUP DRAFT, supra
note 20, at 43.
313. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at app. 2, p.1 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101
with suggested changes appearing in italics); WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra note 20,
at 122 (same).
314. WORKING GROUP DRAFT, supra note 20, at 122.
315. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 217-18.
316. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, supra note 307;
see WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 225; WORKING GROUP DRAFr, supra
note 20, at 132-33.
317. N. Jansen Calanita, Note, Coming to Terms with the Celestial Jukebox: Keep-
ing the Sound Recording Copyright Viable in the Digital Age, 74 B.U. L REV. 505,
522 (1994).
318. Id. at 519, 522.
319. Id. at 519.
effectively limits the income of sound recording artists to actual record
sales, could have devastated the income of sound recording artists. 2°
2. Content Providers' Responses to the Primary Purpose and
Effect Test
The original primary purpose and effect test proposed by the Working
Group sparked controversy among content providers, especially those in
the music industry. The providers professed that the primary purpose
and effect test contradicted the fundamentals of copyright law because it
required a choice between rights that are supposed to be fully divisible,
not mutually exclusive.2 The proposal was especially troublesome for
music publishers and composers, who feared that the performance right,
a valuable source of their income, would be subsumed under the repro-
duction right, a negligible income source.3" Critics also claimed that
the amendment would create, not reduce, uncertainty and litigation. 3
Music publishers and composers further feared that the proposed test
would force most NII transmissions to be categorized as reproductions,
not performances, a result which could have a detrimental impact on
their earnings. Under the proposed test, a transmission of both a musical
reproduction and a musical performance would yield only mechanical
royalties as compensation.24 Traditionally, composers and song writers
320. WORING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 221-25; WORKING GROUP DRAFt,
supra note 20, at 132; see 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1994).
321. See supra notes 114-32 and accompanying text (discussing divisibility of exclu.
sive rights); Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Marilyn
Bergman, Lyricist) (arguing that the test contradicts the principle that creators can
exploit none, some, or all of the exclusive rights at the same time); Working Group
Hearing III, supra note 4, at 20 (statement of Cy Coleman, Composer, Vice Presi-.
dent, ASCAP) (explaining that under existing law the rights are granted independent..
ly).
322. Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 19-20 (statement of Stu Gardner%.
Artist, Producer, and Composer); Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 3840
(statement of Pat Rogers, Executive Director, Nashville Songwriters Association Inter-
national).
323. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 42 (statement of Steven Ames
Brown, Attorney) ("The distinction ... is nearly metaphysical and would cause un-,
ending bickering in the courts."); Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 50
(statement of Ann Harkins, Co-Director, Creative Incentive Coalition) (suggesting that
individual analysis required by the test would result in a nonenforceable situation);
Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 30-31 (statement of Marilyn Bergman,
Lyricist) (expressing the view that parties will fight to achieve the outcome under the
test that best serves their interest, which will result in endless litigation); id. at 41.
(statement of Edward Murphy, President and CEO, National Music Publishers Associa-
tion) (suggesting that the amendment would "create havoc rather than certainty as tP
the use of works on the Nil1).
324. Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Marilyn Berg-
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relied on both mechanical and performance royalties for their liveli-
hood."  Without assurance that they would continue to receive the
same performance royalties on the NII that they have customarily re-
ceived from other media, composers and song writers would be given
little or no incentive to "go digital. " 6 This "seriously endanger[ed] the
future availability of music in this country on the NII."327
The choice that the test would have required, between the reproduc-
tion right and the performance right,3" was not equitable. Copyright
law has long made it clear that rights are divisible and not mutually ex-
clusive.' Therefore, the need to force a choice between exclusive
rights in the digital context is questionable, especially considering the
potential impact on content providers.' Determining which right or
rights have been violated affects the defenses available and the ability of
the holder of the right to pursue an infringement action.' Heeding
these warnings, the Working Group abolished the "primary purpose or ef-
fect" test in the final draft. Instead, they noted that "[a] transmission
could be a transmission of a reproduction or a performance or both." '
The Working Group recognized the courtroom as the place to finally
resolve this debate."
man, Lyricist).
325. Composers and songwriters have relied on both mechanical and performance
royalties because a maximum, fixed rate per song is paid for each copy of the re-
cord or tape made or distributed. Some parties, such as record companies, believe
that creators' incomes will not be hurt by the receipt of only mechanical royalties
because they believe that the mechanical royalties are substantial. See Working Group
Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 27-28 (statement of Michael Pollack, Vice President and
Senior Counsel, Sony Music Entertainment).
326. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of James Newton
Howard, Songwriter and Record Producer); Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4,
at 34 (statement of Frances Preston, President and CEO, BMI).
327. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of James Newton
Howard, Songwriter and Record Producer).
328. Or, alternatively, the reproduction right and the display right.
329. See supra notes 114-32, 321 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 114-66 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 321-30 and accompanying text
332. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 218.
333. Id.; see also Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 13 (statement of Ar-
thur Levine, law firm of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, on behalf
of the American Federation of Musicians and the American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists) ("[Tihe courts are probably the proper venue to ultimately decide
those questions.").
D. The Display Right
Corresponding with the public performance right, the Copyright Act
also grants an exclusive right to a copyright owner to "display the work
copyrighted publicly."' To "display" a work, according to § 101, means
"to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, televi-
sion image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images
nonsequentially. "w 5 The display right is similar to the performance
rights in that, for the right to be implicated, there must be a "public"
showing, the right must be limited to certain types of works, and there
must be a "display." '
Many NII uses, as the Working Group notes, come under the umbrella
of the display right."? Like the reproduction right, in the absence of a
successful defense, a user would rarely be able to browse a work on the
NIl without potential infringement liability.' To create an NIl lane for
noninfringing use, a browsing exception similar to that proposed for
reproductions, may be appropriate.' With such an amendment, a NII
334. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1994). The display right includes a list of specific works to
which it applies. Id. Of the usual works considered under the scope of protection,
only sound recordings are excluded from the display right. Id.
335. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
336. Furthermore, a first sale exclusion applies to displays, but this exclusion does
not apply to NII transactions. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1994); HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JuDIcIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 48, at 80, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5693-94. The House Report specifies that "the display . . . of a copy-
righted work would be an infringement if the image were transmitted by any method
(by closed or open circuit television, for example, or by a computer system) from
one place to members of the public located elsewhere." Id. at 80, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5694.
337. WORKING GROUP REPORr, supra note 42, at 72.
338. Id.; WOmaNG GROUP DRAFr, supra note 20, at 44; see also supra notes 277-80
(depriving users of a right to browse is simply not fair). But see Working Group
Hearing II, supra note 4, at 24 (statement of Robert Steinberg, law firm of Ireli &
Manella, Intellectual Property Counsel to Times-Mirror Co.) (recommending that dis-
play right, as well as reproduction right, should apply to protect against informal
browsing).
339. See supra note 284-96 and accompanying text. This proposed amendment could
account for noninfringing display use. For example, the amendment could read:
§ 121. Limitations on exclusive rights: Random Access Memory displays
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(1), it is not an in-
fringement of a copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted
work when a copy is made into a computer's Random Access Memory for
the sole purpose of display or browsing.
(2) The exclusion under this section does not apply when a copyrighted
work is copied from a computer's Random Access Memory onto other memo-
ry functions of the computer, such as a hard disk drive or floppy diskette,
or when a work is further copied from a computer's Random Access Memo-
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user would be entitled to initially browse a work without feeling the
liability sword or forcing a fair use shield. Content providers would still
control their works, but they would not exercise control of all access to
information on the NIl. This approach would likely preserve the constitu-
tional balance of copyright law.
E. The Derivative Right
Beyond the rights associated with a copyright owner's primary work,
the Copyright Act grants an exclusive right to "prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work. " "° The derivative works right, or
"adaptation right," grants the copyright owner exclusive control over the
privilege to translate, arrange, dramatize, fictionalize, film, record, repro-
duce, abridge, condense, or do anything else to the original work to re-
cast, transform, or adapt it into a derivative form."4 Modifications, revi-
sions, annotations, or elaborations are also derivative works. 2 A suc-
cessful plaintiff in a derivative works action must prove two essential
elements: originality' and substantial similarity.' Sound recordings
are further limited by statute, wherein the derivative right extends to
works "in which actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rear-
ranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality." "
Under prevailing law, the copyright owner must prove that an infring-
ing "derivative work" is substantially similar in order to establish liabili-
ry for the purpose of distribution or reproduction.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), it is not an in-
fringement of a copyright owner's exclusive right to display a copyrighted
work when a display is made on a computer's Random Access Memory for
the sole purpose of browsing.
Proposed by author.
340. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994).
341. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining a "derivative work").
342. Id.
343. Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 778, 788-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (stating that essential element in derivative claims is "the originality of the new
work"), modified, 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991) ("[O]riginality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is
the touchstone of copyright protection.").
344. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1991) (outlining the substantial
similarity test); accord United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 377
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
345. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)(2) (1994).
ty. In the digital environment, works can be easily copied and manip-
ulated, even to the extent that they no longer are "substantially similar"
to the original work. 7 As a consequence of this, the derivative right
will be difficult to enforce, and content providers will lose a valuable
right and compensation." The Working Group suggests that the sub-
stantial similarity test should not be applied to derivative works because
"neither the meaning of 'derivative work' nor the statutory standard for
infringement appears to require an infringing derivative work to be sub-
stantially similar." 9 The "substantially similar" test was created by the
courts to resolve the issue of proof of copying."5 Some decisions tenta-
tively relied on this test with respect to derivative works."' Thus, the
solution to the problems created when applying the substantial similarity
test to digitally created derivative works must necessarily lie with the
judiciary. 2
As the preceding discussion illustrates, defining and balancing the
bundle of rights is an important, yet controversial, aspect of the NII de-
bate.' A more heated issue in the recent past was the assignment of
responsibility for copyright violations.' The next section of this Com-
ment will examine the various sides of this infringement liability de-
bate.4
346. See infra notes 356-88 and accompanying text.
347. WORKING GRouP REPORT, supra note 42, at 106-07.
348. See Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 71 (statement of Charles D.
Ossola, General Counsel, American Society of Media Photographers) (discussing the
strong negative impact this enforcement difficulty will have on the holders of photo-
graph copyrights).
349. WORKING GROuP REPORT, supra note 42, at 106-07.
350. Id. at 101-02.
351. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that "a
work is not derivative unless it has been substantially copied from the prior work")..
352. The Southern District of New York recently lost an opportunity to address this
issue when a photo agency settled its suit against a newspaper for digitally scanning
and altering photographic images. FPG Int'l v. Newsday, Inc., 94 Civ. 1036 (S.D.N.Y.
settled Oct 31, 1994) (on file with author).
353. See supra notes 114-352 and accompanying text.
354. See Legislation: Two Days of Hearings on NII Bill Consider Provider Liabili-
ty and Fair Use, 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 484 (BNA) (Feb. 15, 1996).
355. See infra notes 356-553 and accompanying text.
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IV. INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY
A. What is Infringement?
The exercise of any of the exclusive rights conferred by Title 17 is an
infringement absent authorization by the copyright owner or an affirma-
tive defense.' Uses of a copyrighted work that do not violate a spe-
cific right under Title 17, such as "fair use," however, are not infringe-
ments."l As a civil remedy, "[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclu-
sive right under a copyright is entitled... to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the
owner of it." ' Such an action may be brought against a direct,' vi-
carious," or contributory infringer."I Because infringement actions
sound in tort, courts have consistently held that all defendants who par-
ticipate in infringement, whether directly, vicariously, or contributorily,
are jointly and severally liable.'
356. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984); see in(fra notes 389-406 and
accompanying text (discussing affirmative defenses that may apply to copyright ac-
tions).
357. Sony, 464 U.S. at 432-33.
358. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994).
359. "Personal participation in the infringing activity will result in direct liability."
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801,
811 (11th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 407-10 and accompanying text.
360. Vicarious liability is predicated on either an agency relationship or the right
and ability of the defendant to supervise infringing activity coupled with an obvious
and direct financial interest in the activity. See, e.g., LAttle Mole Music v. Spike Inv.,
Inc., 720 F. Supp. 751, 755-56 (W.D. Mo. 1989); see infra notes 451-71 and accom-
panying text
361. Contributory liability is premised on proof of defendant's knowledge of the in-
fringing activity and defendant's inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the
infringing conduct. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc.,
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); see infra notes 472-509 and accompanying text.
362. Harms, Inc. v. Sainsom House Enters., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129, 135 (E.D. Pa.
1958), affd sub nom. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494 (3d
Cir. 1959).
1. The Plaintiffs Burden in a Copyright Infringement Action
a. Copying
To prove copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show ownership of
a valid copyright and copying of a protected expression by the defen-
dant.' A plaintiff is not required to provide direct evidence and may
show infringement by use of circumstantial evidence.3" Proof of in-
fringement with circumstantial evidence, however, requires the plaintiff
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had ac-
cess to the copyrighted work and that protected elements of the two
works are identical or substantially similar.'
i. Access
"Access is 'the opportunity to view or copy'" plaintiffs copyrighted
work.' Access through third parties connected to both parties in an
infringement action is sufficient to prove defendant's access to plaintiffs
copyrighted work.6 7 Based on these standards, access would be rela-
tively simple to prove in the digital arena.. For instance, access is suffi-
ciently shown where someone has an electronic address and his service
provider allows access to the copyrighted work.
ii. Substantial similarity
(1). Ordinary observer test
Traditionally, the criterion for determining whether there is a substan-
tial similarity between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing
work was, "whether an ordinary lay observer would detect a substantial
similarity between the works."' 8 More recently, the Fourth Circuit
363. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 618 (N.D. Cal.
1993), affd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
Courts generally use the term "copying" to denote a violation of any one of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights, not just the reproduction right WOPKING GROUP
REPORT, supra note 42, at 101.
364. Harms, 162 F. Supp. at 135-36; see WORKING GROUP REPOrr, supra note 42, at
101-02.
365. Levine v. McDonald's Corp., 735 F. Supp. 92, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Harms, 162 F.
Supp. at 135-36.
366. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 558 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), affd in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir.
1977)).
367. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir. 1988).
368. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975).
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modified this test and found that the ordinary observer standard should
be based on the determination of an ordinary observer from the intended
audience of the work.' As the Working Group observes, this modified
ordinary observer test may be more difficult to apply in the digital envi-
ronment."' The demarcation line between specialized audiences and
the general public becomes less clear in the Nil because of increased
access to all works by all audiences.3"'
(2). Non-literal copying
There may be an infringement where a work has not been "copied"
word for word, but it has been paraphrased or reworked.3 ' 2 Applying
the substantial similarity standard in such a "non-literal" case is more
complicated."7 ' Therefore, courts have developed many tests to deter-
mine whether there is a substantial similarity between the copyrighted
work and the non-literal copy. These include the abstractions test,374
the subtractive test,375 the totality test,37 6 the extrinsic/intrinsic
test, 77 'and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.378 Applying a
substantial similarity test to derivative works in the digital environment
369. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736-37 (4th Cir. 1990).
370. WORMNG GROuP REPORT, supra note 42, at 105-06.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 102.
373. Id. at 102-07.
374. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altair, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), qffd in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). As applied to com-
puter software, the abstractions test of substantial similarity between copyrighted
program and allegedly infringing program progresses in order of increasing generality
from object code, to source code, to parameter list, to services required, and to gen-
eral outline. Id.
375. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908-09 (3d Cir. 1975)
(comparing elements of similarity and dissimilarity between original work and alleg-
edly infringing work to determine the sum of similar elements).
376. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1970)
(applying a "total concept and feel" test for determining similarity of greeting cards).
377. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that idea similarity is an extrinsic, factual determination
while expression similarity is an intrinsic, reasonable person evaluation).
378. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834-36 (10th Cir. 1993).
When applying "abstraction-filtration-comparison test," copyrighted and allegedly in-
fringing computer programs are first compared in their entirety, without filtering out
unprotected elements, to reveal possible patterns of copying not obvious when only
certain components of the programs are examined. Id.
is particularly problematic because they can be manipulated with digital
technology to a point where there is little or no similarity to the
original.79
b. Scienter
To prevail on a direct copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff is
required to show that the defendant violated one of the exclusive
rights. ° Scienter is not a necessary element of the action.' Addition-
ally, a defendant who copies from an infringing copy is liable to the
copyright owner. 2 Furthermore, the infringing act need not be done
for profit.' Thus, a direct copyright infringement action is viewed as a
form of "strict liability."' To prevail on a vicarious or contributory in-
fringement claim, the plaintiff is required to show a higher level of scien-
ter.' In a vicarious liability action, the plaintiff must show constructive
knowledge,' which can be shown either by an agency relationship be-
tween the defendant and the direct infringer or by the defendant's right
and ability to supervise the direct infringer coupled with an obvious and
direct financial interest in the infringing activity. 7 In a contributory
379. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 71 (statement of Charles D.
Ossola, American Society of Media Photographers) (expressing concern about the
prospect of taking a copyrighted, digitized photograph and manipulating it "such that
no reasonable fact-finder would view the end result as substantially similar").
380. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
381. Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 795 F. Supp. 1423, 1437 (N.D. Iowa 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 23 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 1994). Although intent is not essential
to the question of direct liability, such intent may have an effect on the finding of
fair use. Wihtol v. Crow, 199 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D. Iowa 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962). Intent may also be relevant to the issue of
damages. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 188 F. Supp. 235, 237
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also infra note 394 and accompanying text (discussing fair use)
and infra notes 554-57 and accompanying text (discussing damages).
382. See Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (holding a copyright
was not invalid by a misdating).
383. Pathe Exch., Inc. v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 3 F.
Supp. 63, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
384. See Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining
that defendant is absolutely liable for innocent and accidental infringement); see also
Samet & Wells, Inc. v. Shalom Toy Co., 429 F. Supp. 895, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating
that intent or knowledge is not a necessary element of copyright infringement liabili-
ty), affd, 578 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1978); Morser v. Bengor Prod. Co., 283 F. Supp. 926,
928 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that the innocence of the infringer is immaterial in deter-
mining copyright infringement).
385. See infra notes 451-509 and accompanying text (discussing vicarious and con-
tributory infringement).
386. See infra note 451 and accompanying text (discussing constructive knowledge
requirement for vicarious liability).
387. See infra notes 451-71 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of
[Vol. 24: 121, 1996] Information Superhighway
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
liability action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had knowledge
of the violator's action and induced, caused, or materially contributed to
that action.s
2. Shifting the Burden to the Defendant
Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of copyright infringe-
ment, the defendant must offer evidence to negate the probability of
copying, beyond merely denying infringement.' In a case based on cir-
cumstantial evidence, the defendant may negate "substantial similarity"
evidence by offering evidence that the copy in question was independent-
ly created,' ° or the defendant may offer other evidence to explain simi-
larity between the two works."'
As in most civil cases,' when a copyright defendant offers an affir-
mative defense, the defendant has the burden of proof.' Copyright de-
fendants may shield themselves from liability by using both statutory and
nonstatutory defenses. Fair use, one statutory defense, absolves a defen-
dant of infringement liability.3 Nonstatutory defenses, including estop-
vicarious liability).
388. See infrau notes 472-509 and accompanying text (discussing liability for con-
tributory infringement).
389. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Newman Bros., 373 F.2d 905, 907 (6th Cir. 1967).
390. Arrow Novelty Co. v. ENCO Nat'l Corp., 393 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
affd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975). In a copyright infringement action involving manu-
facture and distribution of a sculpture, the district court shifted the burden of persua-
sion to the alleged infringers. John L Perry Studio, Inc. v. Wernick, 597 F.2d 1308,
1310-11 (9th Cir. 1979). Once the plaintiffs successfully established a prima facie case
of infringement, the court required the defendants to show that their sculptures were
independently created. Id.
391. Hollywood Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Dushkin, 136 F. Supp. 738, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
In an action for copyright infringement of a trade catalog, the plaintiff had the bur-
den of proving that defendant copied the catalog; however, once plaintiff made a
strong prima facie showing, the burden moved to defendant to explain the similari-
ties. R.R. Donnelley & Sons v. Haber, 43 F. Supp. 456, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
392. 29 Am. JUR. 2D Evidence § 155-167 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
393. 29 Am. JUR. 2D Evidence § 160 (1994).
394. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The factors that must be considered in determining the
application of the fair use defense are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
pel,395 misuse,396 unclean hands,39 res judicata,398 and laches,"'
can bar a copyright plaintiffs recovery. Other defenses, such as acknowl-
edgement, °° antitrust,40 ' apparent authority,4 2 good faith,40 3 in-
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id.
395. Proving plaintiff is at least partially responsible for alleged infringement is
critical to the application of estoppel to copyright infringement. Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). To
use estoppel as a defense, a copyright defendant must prove that the plaintiff helped
the defendant commit allegedly infringing acts or that the plaintiff induced or caused
the defendant to act. Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Causation is established if there is express or implied consent-such as a statement
by the plaintiff that he or she does not consider the defendant's acts to be an in-
fringement of copyright or does not object to the defendant's action. Id. at 296.
396. Misuse is an absolute defense for a copyright infringement case, but cannot be
a tool for affirmative relief. See QAD. Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261,
1266 (N.D. M. 1991), aWfd, 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992); Broadcast Music, 746 F.
Supp. at 327-28. In one misuse case, anticompetitive language in a software licensing
agreement which forbade the licensee from developing computer-assisted die-maldng
software amounted to misuse of copyright. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d
970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990). Such misuse of a copyright license, by exaggerating rights of
the copyright owner, barred plaintiffs recovery. Id.
397. In Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1969), a supper club
owner requested assistance from a licensing agency to avoid infringement of copy-
rights on musical compositions. Id. at 507. The agency did not comply with the
owner's request for listing of association compositions and also failed to offer editing
services required by the antitrust decree under which the association operated. Id.
Therefore, under the doctrine of "unclean hands," the conduct of the association
estopped the copyright owners from asserting infringement and asking for damages
and attorney fees. Id.
398. Jones v. Craig, 212 F.2d 187, 187-88 (6th Cir. 1954) (discussing res judicata);
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 378 F. Supp. 485, 490
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 509 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that collateral estoppel barred
relitigation of the adequacy of a copyright notice in a subsequent damages case).
399. Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the doctrine of laches
to bar a copyright infringement claim by a musician who waited 22 years to assert
the claim).
400. Henry Holt & Co. ex rel. Felderman v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.
Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (holding that defendant's acknowledgement of the
source from which copyrighted material is taken does not release defendant from
legal liability).
401. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan.
1987) (concluding that antitrust violations are not valid defenses to copyright infringe-
ment), affd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
402. Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 828-30 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
book promoter's apparent authority to authorize use of author's copyrighted material
is not an acceptable defense to buyer's infringement).
403. Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that defendant's
good faith belief that activity is not infringing will not absolve defendant from liabili-
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structions against infringement,4 °4 lack of intent,"5 and lack of
knowledge,4° will not relieve a defendant from liability.
B. Direct Liability
Direct liability is imposed when a copyright owner proves that a defen-
dant has violated one of the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright
Act.4 7 There is a strict liability standard for copyright infringement.
48
Specific intent or actual knowledge of the infringement is irrelevant; the
only pertinent question is whether an exclusive right has been violat-
ed.4' Even where a defendant legitimately copied a work from a third
party without authority to authorize the copying, direct liability may be
imposed."'
ty); accord Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 621 n.53
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
404. Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184, 1185 (D. Minn. 1977) (reasoning
that a restaurant owner could not escape copyright infringement liability by in-
structing musicians not to play copyrighted music because he acquiesced to infringe-
ment).
405. Toksvig v. Bruce Publ'g Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950) (ruling that lack
of intent is not a defense to apparent copyright infringement); see also United States
v. Brown, 400 F. Supp. 656, 658 (S.D. Miss. 1975) (stating that willfulness is immate-
rial to determining liability).
406. Pickwick Music Corp. v. Record Prods., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 39, a1 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (reiterating that ignorance is not a defense); see also Altman v. New Haven
Union Co., 254 F. 113, 119 (D. Conn. 1918) (holding defendant could not avoid copy-
right infringement liability when he published a photograph that he did not know was
copyrighted).
407. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994); Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 25
(statement of Ellen Kirsh, Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, America
Online, Inc.).
408. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993);
Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 25-26 (statement of Ellen Kirsh, Vice
President, General Counsel and Secretary, America Online, Inc.); see also infra notes
423-26 (discussing Playboy).
409. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994); see also Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 795 F.
Supp. 1423, 1437 (N.D. Iowa 1991) ("No scienter need be. shown to prove infringe-
ment."), rev'd on other grounds, 23 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 1994).
410. Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1978) (explaining that defendant
might not even know that plaintiff exists, much less that plaintiff owns a copyright in
a work that defendant holds).
1. NIl Users
NII users are likely to directly violate copyrights on a daily basis."'
Under the Working Group's proposed amendment to the Copyright Act
and some current case law, even the act of bringing a work onto a com-
puter screen violates the reproduction or display right."'2 Thus, the very
act of retrieving information from a web site would, in absence of a
defense, constitute an infringement."'3 Nil users could be held liable
even if they did not profit from infringement 4"' or know that they were
violating a copyright.4"5
Enforceability likely poses the most challenging problem that a copy-
right holder would face in prosecuting infringement claims against Nil
users."'6 With more than thirty-seven million users, where would a
copyright owner begin?"'7 How would a copyright holder locate the us-
ers who are infringing a work that exists in cyberspace" 18 Why would a
copyright owner pursue a claim against an NII user who may be judg-
ment-proof?"'9 In short, it would not be practical for copyright owners
to bring infringement claims against NII users, the little fish."2 ' Instead,
411. See supra notes 247, 259-80 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
inherent in applying current copyright law to acts of browsing, viewing, or reading
work on a computer screen by an NI user).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding that
civil liability does not require that plaintiff prove sale of or profits from infringing
copies).
415. See supra notes 409-10 and accompanying text (establishing that intent is not
necessary for copyright infringement to exist).
416. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 25, at 3 (finding copyright laws difficult to
enforce on the Internet); Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 31 (statement
of Jim Schatz, West Publishing) (expressing concern of content providers about the
"difficulty of tracking down and effectively dealing with [copyright] violations"); Work-
ing Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 56 (statement of Terry Southwick, member
of the Working Group) (noting that Nil users may be anonymous, difficult to identify,
and without "deep pockets").
417. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
418. See Comments of Paul Basista, National Vice President for Legislation, Graphic
Artists Guild, to the U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., at *1 (visited Dec. 1, .1996) <go-
pher.//sunbird.usd.edu or http://www.wwa.com> (noting a lack of practical proposed
methods for monitoring, preventing, or redressing copyright infringement).
419. See Timothy F. Bliss, Computer Bulletin Boards and the Green Paper, 2 J.
INTELL. PRop. L 537, 538 (1995) (identifying the daunting prospect of pursuing a
claim against an NII user who lacks money to satisfy a judgment).
420. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 70 (statement of Charles D.
Ossola, American Society of Media Photographers) ("Not only is the prospect of suing
hundreds of persons on the network uninviting on its face, it is economically unfeasi-
ble."); Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1 (discussing attorneys' views that problems with
detection and cost of pursuing individual infringers are not worth the effort).
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it is likely that copyright owners will focus on the BBS operators and
service providers, the bigger fish.42'
2. BBS Operators
The direct liability of BBS operators for copyright infringement, both
criminal and civil, is currently being tested in the courts and legisla-
ture.
422
a. Civil liability
In some recent cases, plaintiffs have pursued BBS operators for direct
copyright infringement.4" In one such case, a copyright owner was suc-
cessful in prosecuting a direct liability action against a BBS operator.424
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, a BBS operator was found liable
for copyright infringement, even though he did not have knowledge of
the infringing content on the bulletin board and promptly removed the
copyrighted material when he learned of it.425 The court reiterated that,
even in the digital environment, "[i]ntent to infringe is not needed to find
421. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 56 (statement of Terry Southwick,
member of the Working Group); see Maureen O'Rourke, Proprietary Rights in Digital
Data, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 511, 515 (Aug. 1994) (noting that copyright owner would
prefer to recover from the deep pocket bulletin board operator). But see Working
Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 52 (statement of Kent Stuckey, General Counsel
and Secretary, CompuServe, Inc.) (lamenting the burden on responsible service pro-
viders "who are perceived as deep pockets"); Working Group Hearing II, supra note
4, at 56 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Professor of Law, UCLA) (noting that even if
copyright owners lack an adequate remedy, imposing liability on innocent parties,
such as service providers, is not an acceptable solution).
422. Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 51 (statement of Kent Stuckey,
General Counsel and Secretary, CompuServe, Inc.) (agreeing with the Working Group
that it is unclear whether system and service providers are liable for direct infringe-
ment); M. David Dobbins, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for Users'
Infringing Acts, 94 MICH. L REV. 217, 219 (1995) (stating that while courts have
begun to address the issue of BBS operator liability, there is no clear consensus).
423. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1562 (M.D. Fla 1993) (find-
ing liability for digital transmissions of photographs); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA,
857 F. Supp. 679, 686-89 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (imposing liability for on-line distribution of
computer software).
424. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1562; see supra notes 138-43 and accompanying
text (evaluating the rights implicated in the Playboy case).
425. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1554-57. But cf. Working Group Hearing III, supra
note 4, at 25-26 (statement of Ellen Kirsh, Vice President, General Counsel and Secre-
tary, America Online, Inc.) (expressing concern over the result of the Playboy case).
copyright infringement.... [tihus even an innocent infringer is liable for
infringement."42 Playboy is the first case to hold an NII provider strict-
ly liable for infringement occurring on his service.
In a similar case, a court issued an injunction against a BBS operator
for his directly and contributorily infringing activities.427 In Sega Enter-
prises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, Chad Scherman, operator of the BBS, MAPHIA,
allegedly allowed users to upload and download Sega's copyrighted
games." The court found that Sega showed a high probability of suc-
ceeding on a direct and contributory infringement action on the mer-
its;42 thus, Scherman was ordered to surrender all material that would
infringe on Sega's protected copyright interests."0
In one case analogous to the action of a BBS operator, the operators
of a swap meet were not held liable for direct copyright infringement
connected to vendor sales of counterfeit music tapes because of an ab-
sence of proof that the operators themselves reproduced, prepared, or
distributed copyrighted works. 2" Unless a copyright owner can show
that a right has been directly violated by a BBS operator, the copyright
owner will likely have to utilize a vicarious or contributory infringement
theory to prosecute a copyright claim.
432
b. Criminal liability
Criminal liability of BBS operators is also a source of recent judicial
and legislative activity.4 In one recent case, a BBS operator pleaded
guilty to criminal charges of copyright infringement.2" In this case,
Richard Kenadek operated a for-profit BBS service, known as Davey
Jones Locker, wherein he allowed copyrighted software materials to be
uploaded or downloaded by subscribers.4 5 In another more controver-
426. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
427. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 682, 690-91; see supra notes 144-60 and accompanying
text (discussing further the legal claims in Sega).
428. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 683-84.
429. Id. at 689.
430. Id. at 690-91.
431. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1495 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that plaintiffs stated a sufficient cause of action for vicarious and contributo-
ry copyright infringement), rev'd on other grounds, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
432. See infra notes 451-71 (vicarious liability), 472-73 (contributory liability) and ac-
companying text.
433. See United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994); S. 1122,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (LaMacchia Bill); Copyright Violator, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 16, 1994, Economy sec., at 79 (discussing Kenadek case).
434. Copyright Violator, supra note 433.
435. See Barbara Carton, Man Charged in Software Piracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1,
1994, Bus. sec., at 41, available in 1994 WL 5973393; Josh Hyatt, FBI Raids Corn-
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sial case, a BBS operator was found not criminally liable for his alleged
infringement activities.' David LaMacchia was charged with allowing
users to upload and download copyrighted software from his BBS at no
charge. 7 The government prosecuted LaMacchia based on his alleged
violations of wire fraud statutes,"s but could not prosecute him under
the Copyright Act because his activities were not for profit, a specific re-
quirement of the criminal provision of the Act.' The court found that
the government could not base its prosecution on wire fraud statutes
because those statutes were preempted by the Copyright Act." ° As
such, the case against LaMacchia was dismissed."
The outcome of LaMacchia infuriated many copyright owners, particu-
larly in the software industry."2 The Working Group opines that the
LaMacchia decision "demonstrates that the current law is insufficient to
prevent flagrant copyright violations in the NII context."' Recently, a
bill was introduced into Congress that would purportedly remedy this
"problem."'"
3. Service Providers
This issue of who is responsible was the focus of the litigation in a
recent class action suit filed by music publishers." In Frank Music
Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc., CompuServe did not place songs on-line, but
subscribers uploaded and downloaded songs using the CompuServe sys-
puter Bulletin Board-Giving Out Copyrighted Software is Alleged, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 11, 1992, Bus. sec., at 39, available in 1994 WL 4179515.
436. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 537.
437. Id. at 536.
438. Id. at 536-37.
439. Id. at 539-40.
440. Id. at 545.
441. Id.
442. See 141 CONG. REC. S11451-52 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (comment of Senator
Leahy).
443. WORING GROUP REPORTr, supra note 42, at 127. Even the judge who dismissed
the charges against LaMacchia condemned his alleged behavior as "heedlessly irre-
sponsible, and at worst as nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking in any fundamental
sense of values," and suggested that the legislature create penalties designed to ad-
dress this type of infringement. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545.
444. S. 1122, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995); see infra notes 567-69 and accompanying
text (discussing the LaMacchia bill).
445. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov.
29, 1993).
tern."' The plaintiffs in that action claimed that the song duplication
took place at the server level, making CompuServe directly responsible
for royalty payments."7 CompuServe disavowed liability, claiming that
as a highway provider, they were "in no position to check every piece of
information that comes over the system."" Because the case recently
settled, the liability issue was never adjudicated."9 Without admitting
liability, CompuServe agreed to make the royalty payments.4"
C. Vicarious Liability-Connection to the Infringer
Imposition of vicarious liability in a copyright action is premised on a
type of constructive knowledge in which a responsible secondary infring-
er must be "in a position to police the conduct of the 'primary' infring-
er."4"' Unlike patent law, copyright law follows no direct statutory au-
thority concerning vicarious liability.452 Thus, vicarious liability stan-
dards in copyright actions have developed by case law.4" Vicarious lia-
bility may be imposed on one who has a special relationship, such as
agency or partnership, with the direct infringer.4" In absence of such a
relationship, vicarious liability may be found where a defendant has the
right and ability to supervise infringing activities and maintains a direct
financial interest in those activities.455 A vicarious infringer is jointly
and severally liable to the plaintiff.
4
1
446. Seyamack Kouretchian, Digital Pirates Are Plundering Performance Rights:
While the Law Catches up to High-Tech, Royalties Are Not Being Paid to Owners of
Protected Works, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at C12.
447. Kouretchian, supra note 446.
448. Matthew Goldstein, Novel Copyright Claims Raised in Suits Against Online
Providers, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 1994, at 5 (quoting Peter Herbert, attorney representing
CompuServe, Inc.).
449. Rudell, supra note 163, at 3.
450. Id.
451. Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 914 (D.C. Conn. 1980)
(quoting Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir.
1963)).
452. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
453. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. NevadaTig, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1320 (D.
Mass. 1994) (noting that both vicarious and contributory liability have, by case law,
derived from the tort enterprise liability theory).
454. See Bradbury v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 287 F. 2d 478, 484-85 (9th Cir.
1961) (imposing vicarious liability on an employer because of an employee who had
infringed copyrights); see also Lorek, supra note 31, at 11 (warning companies of
potential liability for employee downloading activity).
455. Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. H.L Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d. Cir. 1963)
(imposing liability on a chain store owner who had ability to control the sales of
bootleg records and derived financial benefit from those sales).
456. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (finding that contributory liability is derived from the tort doctrine).
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The earliest cases of vicarious liability in copyright are the "Dance
Hall" cases.457 In those cases, courts imposed liability on owners of en-
tertainment clubs when the bands that played there violated musical
composers' performance rights.4' The courts in the Dance Hall cases
held the owners jointly and severally liable for the copyright violation,
even though the proprietors had no knowledge or control over which
compositions were played.459 Bare allegations that a defendant owned
the place where the compositions were rendered, and indirectly profited
from the rendering, were sufficient to establish liability.41 In fact, even
when the copyright violations directly contravened an owner's instruc-
tions, the owner was still liable.4 1' Recent cases follow the rationale of
the Dance Hall cases by imposing vicarious responsibility even when a
defendant instructs against, or is unaware of, a copyright violation.462
457. See, e.g., Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354
(7th Cir. 1929); Buck v. Pettijohn, 34 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Tenn. 1940); Buck v. Dacier,
26 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1938); Buck v. Russo, 25 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mass. 1938); M.
Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1927).
458. Dream/and, 36 F.2d at 355; Pettijohn, 34 F. Supp. at 968; Dacier, 26 F. Supp.
at 39; Russo, 25 F. Supp. at 321; M. Witmark, 22 F.2d at 414.
459. Dreamland, 36 F.2d at 355; Pettijohn, 34 F. Supp. at 968; Dacier, 26 F. Supp.
at 38-39; Russo, 25 F. Supp. at 320; M. Witmark, 22 F.2d at 413-14.
460. Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 26 F.2d 149, 150 (E.D. La.), rev'd on other
grounds, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929). In a similar vicarious liability case, a court held
a theater operator vicariously liable for infringing the performance right of a musical
composition that was within a motion picture shown at the theater. Famous Music
Corp. v. Melz, 28 F. Supp. 767, 769 (W.D. La. 1939). The theater owner was found re-
sponsible regardless of his ignorance that the film contained a copyright violation
within it, or his lack of ability to know such a fact. Id. at 768-69. Because the
theater "open[ed] its doors, inviteld] the public, collect[ed] admission fees, and repro-
duce[d]" musical compositions audibly to an audience, the owner was vicariously lia-
ble to the composition owner. Id. at 769; see also Buck v. Newsreel, Inc., 25 F.
Supp. 787, 789 (D. Mass. 1938) (finding corporate owner of a for-profit vaudeville
theater liable for musical copyright violations in spite of the fact that the orchestra
and performers were furnished by a separate booking agency for 50% of the gross
receipts).
461. Buck v. Coe, 32 F. Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa- 1940).
462. For example, a restaurant owner was held vicariously liable for copyright in-
fringement, despite the fact that his employees contracted performances without his
knowledge or consent. Superhype Publ'g, Inc. v. Vasiliou, 838 F. Supp. 1220, 1224-26
(S.D. Ohio 1993). The court imposed liability on the defendant because he was a sole
owner, he was responsible for operations, and he was aware that bands and disc
jockeys played there. Id. In another recent case, a tavern owner was held liable for
a band's infringing activities because he had a financial interest coupled with the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity, even though the band agreed not
to perform unauthorized material. Swallow Turn Music v. Wilson, 831 F. Supp. 575,
Vicarious liability has also expanded beyond nightclubs and restau-
rants.
4W
In one recent case, the court refused to impose vicarious liability on
the owners of a swap meet where vendors sold counterfeit music
tapes.4' The court held that the allegations against the owners did not
support a claim for copyright infringement under a vicarious liability
theory, notwithstanding the copyright holders' contention that operators
could have "policed" vendors by refusing to lease space to them.4' The
court found that the operators lacked supervisory power over what ven-
dors sold or how much they charged and that the operators were "not in
the best position to guard against intellectual property violations."
41
Moreover, there was "no suggestion that the [operators] derived a direct
financial benefit" from" the sale of tapes, for example, by receiving a
share of vendor receipts. 467 Thus, the swap meet owners' actions were
not substantial enough to create vicarious liability.4'
In the 1976 revision to the Copyright Act, Congress was asked to
change vicarious liability standards, but refused to do so.
41
Vicarious liability for infringing performances. The committee has considered
and rejected an amendment to this section intended to exempt the proprietors of
an establishment, such as a ballroom or night club, from liability for copyright
infringement committed by an independent contractor, such as an orchestra
laeder [sic]. A well-established principle of copyright law is that a person who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an infringer, includ-
ing persons who can be considered related or vicarious infringers. To be held a
related or vicarious infringer in the case of performing rights, a defendant must
577-79 (E.D. Tex. 1993). In a less recent case, an owner was liable even when the
direct infringers were not paid or employed by him. Harm's, Inc. v. Theodosiades, 246
F. Supp. 799, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
463. A concert artist manager who knew that artists included copyrighted composi-
tions in their performances and knew that neither the local associations nor the per-
forming artists had secured copyright licenses was held to be a "vicarious" and
.contributory" infringer. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (2d Cir. 1971). In another case, the organizers of a computer trade
show were held vicariously liable even though they instructed exhibitors to comply
with copyright laws. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/rig, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314,
1328-33 (D. Mass. 1994). The Polygram court found liability because the organizers
had authority and pervasive control over exhibitors through rules and regulations,
promoted the show through advertising, and profited through rent and viewer admis-
sion fees. Id. at 1328, 1331-32.
464. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496-97 (E.D. Cal.
1994).
465. Id.
466. Id. at 1497.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 48, at 159, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5775.
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either actively operate or supervise the operation of the place wherein the per-
formances occur, or control the content of the infringing program, and expect
commercial gain from the operation and either direct or indirect benefit from the
infringing performance. The committee has decided that no justification exists for
changing existing law, and causing a significant erosion of the public performance
right.
47
In the wake of new revisions to the Copyright Act, it is likely that Con-
gress will again be asked to alter the standards for vicarious liability in
the NII environment."
D. Contributory Infringement-Connection to the Infringing Activity
Liability for contributory infringement may be imposed when the de-
fendant knowingly "induces, causes or materially contributes" to infring-
ing activity.472 Thus, unlike direct and vicarious liability, the contributo-
ry infringer must have actual knowledge of the infringement.473 In addi-
tion, participation by the contributory infringers must be substantial.
74
In most cases, the alleged contributory infringer provides services or
equipment that assists in the direct infringement.4 75 In such a situation,
the threshold question is whether the services or equipment have sub-
stantial noninfringing uses.476 If such substantial, noninfringing uses are
found, there is no liability.7 '
1. Provider of Services or Equipment to the Direct Infringer
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme
Court refused to hold VCR manufacturers liable for contributory infringe-
ment."7 The Court found that the VCR manufacturers "demonstrated a
significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who
license their works for broadcast on free television would not object to
470. Id. at 159-60, reiprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5775-76.
471. See infra notes 510-16 and accompanying text.
472. Gershwin Publ'g Corp v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
473. But see supra notes 409 & 459 and accompanying text.
474. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 625 (N.D. Cal.
1993), affd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
475. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(VCR manufacturers alleged to be contributory infringers).
476. Id. at 442.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 456.
having their broadcasts time shifted by private viewers."479 Additionally,
the television program copyright owners "failed to demonstrate [to the
court] that time-shifting would cause any [real] harm to the potential
market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works."' Therefore, the
court held that the home videotape recorder was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses." Thus, the manufacturers' sale of such equipment
to the general public was not contributory infringement."
Following Sony, the Fifth Circuit found that a producer of a program
designed to defeat a competitor's anti-copying software did not consti-
tute contributory infringement.' The court reasoned that the program
had substantial noninfringing uses.' Plaintiff Vault produced copy-pro-
tected computer diskettes, called "PROLOK," that prevented unautho-
rized copying of the information contained on the diskettes.' Defen-
dant Quaid manufactured diskettes featuring "RAMKEY," a program
which "unlocked" the protective devices contained on the PROLOK dis-
kettes.' The court held that Quaid was not directly liable for copyright
infringement under the "essential step" exception for computer pro-
grams. 7 Further, applying the Sony test, the court found that Quaid
was not contributorily liable because the RAMKEY program was capable
of substantial noninfringing uses, such as making archival copies.'
In an antithetical case, the minois District Court issued a preliminary
injunction after failing to find "substantial" noninfringing use for a video
game duplicating device.489 Defendant JS&A manufactured a device
used to duplicate video games compatible with an Atari system, including
copyrighted games manufactured by Atari.4" Defendant JS&A argued
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. But see Working Group Hearing IV, supra note 4, at 17 (statement of
Heather Florence, Bantam Doubleday) (suggesting that the Sony decision should be
revisited to force equipment manufacturers to have a greater stake in intellectual
* property protection).
483. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
484. Id.
485. Id. at 256.
486. Id. at 257.
487. Id. at 261; see 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1994) (providing that "it is not an in-
fringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make . . . another
copy . . . provided (1) that such a new copy . . . is created as an essential step in
[utilizing] the computer program").
488. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 261-67; see 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (1994) (excluding copy-
ing of computer program for archival purposes).
489. Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Atari was
decided prior to the Vault decision and, accordingly, was a case of first impression
for application of 17 U.S.C. § 117.
490. Id. at 7.
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that the archiving exception of § 117'9' applied to duplication of these
video games, thus making the device capable of substantial, noninfringing
uses.492 The court rejected this argument because of the relative
indelibility of Atari game cartridges, which prevented a need for archival
copies.40 The court found that JS&A was likely responsible for con-
tributory infringement because it manufactured a device that was used
for infringing purposes, rather than substantial noninfringing purpos-
es. 
494
In another case assigning contributory liability, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit found a promoter of cable descrambling equip-
ment responsible to copyright owners under a contributory infringement
theory.4' The promoter engaged in extensive contributory infringement
through promotions of various pirate chips and other infringing devic-
es.4' The promoter also participated in a "Descrambling Summit,"
which informed audiences of developments in the pirate chip business
and instructed viewers on methods to compromise cable program scram-
bling by using pirate chips. 497 The court determined that the promoter
had actual and apparent knowledge that its computer program located in
the marketed chip was copyrighted.49 In addition, the court held that
the promoted items were used primarily for unlawful, infringing uses
rather than legitimate, noninfringing uses.4"
2. Contributory Liability of BBS Operators or Service Providers?
The issue of contributory liability for a BBS operator or a service pro-
vider has not been finally adjudicated.' In Sega, without issuing a final
ruling, the court found that there was a substantial likelihood, sufficient
to sustain a preliminary injunction, that the BBS operator was both di-
491. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (1994).
492. Atari, 597 F. Supp. at 8.
493. Id. at 9-10.
494. Id. at 10.
495. Cable/Home Comnuunication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 847
(11th Cir. 1990).
496. Id. at 846-47.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 846.
499. Id.
500. One opportunity to actually adjudicate such a claim was lost when the parties
to the Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc. class action settled their suit. See
supra notes 445-50 and accompanying text.
rectly and contributorily liable for copyright infringement."° Currently,
there is still at least one "test" case pending that may help answer the
questions of operator and service provider liability for copyright infring-
ing activity undertaken on their systems.' °
Furthermore, a recently decided defamation case may offer some pre-
cedent for defining the scope of service provider liability.' In Cubby,
Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., CompuServe was sued for carrying allegedly
defamatory statements about a computer database called "Skuttle-
but." ' These statements were published on a CompuServe BBS called
"Rumorvlle. " 5° The court absolved CompuServe from liability because
of its limited function with respect to the Rumorville BBS.' The court
found that CompuServe did not "republish" the defamatory statements
because it did not review the statements before they were transmit-
ted."7 In effect, CompuServe was a passive distributor, like a bookstore
or library, rather than an active distributor, like a newspaper or
broadcaster.' Thus, the court held that it would be unreasonable to
expect CompuServe to know the contents of all transmissions on the
service and refused to impose tort liability.'
501. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 689 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
502. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, No. C95-20091 (N.D. Cal.) (verified first amend-
ed complaint filed March 3, 1995). In RTC, owners of copyrights in works by L. Ron
Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, are suing an Internet user, a BBS
operator, Klemesrud, and an Internet access provider, Netcom, for publishing
copyrighted materials. Id. In a recent published ruling, the court in the RTC case
determined as a matter of law that Netcom and Kiemesrud were not liable for direct
or vicarious infringement of the copyrighted material. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1381-82 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The
court did find, however, that the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to Netcom
and Klemesrud's contributory liability. Id. at 1373, 1382. The court also ruled that
Netcom raised a triable issue as to fair use, given its limited participation in, control
over, and benefit derived from the direct infringer's activities. Id. at 1378-81; see Ed-
ward H. Rosenthal & Jeanne Hamburg, Are 'Net Providers Liable for Users' Infringe-
ment? A Federal District Court Rules That if They Have Notice and Fail to Act,
They May Be Contributorily Liable, NAT'L I.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at C4.
503. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
504. Id. at 138.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 140-41.
507. Id. at 139-41.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 140. But see Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,
1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. CL May 24, 1995). In Stratton, the court ruled,
in a partial summary judgment motion, that Prodigy had sufficient editorial control
over the transmissions in its system to constitute a "publisher." Id. at *10. Unlike
CompuServe, Prodigy held itself out to be a family oriented service wherein it
screened for inappropriate content on its system. Id. at *5-6. Therefore, the court
found, Prodigy could also screen for copyright violations. Id. at *10. Prodigy had
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E. Liability Standards for Service Providers
As Judge Learned Hand aptly noted, "as soon as literal appropriation
ceases to be the test, the whole matter is necessarily at large.""' The
liability theories available to a copyright plaintiff allow for numerous
potential defendants, including BBS operators, on-line services, Internet
access providers, discussion group moderators, colleges and universities,
and, of course, Internet users." The exact standards that should be ap-
plied to each of these defendants remains unclear because the cases are
not consistent in assigning responsibility for digital copyright viola-
tions."2 At a minimum, this lack of clarity causes some providers to
pause for concern; at a maximum, the vague state of digital copyright
liability could stunt the growth of the NII for fear of untold liability.1 3
In addition to vagueness of the law, the very potential for far-reaching
strict liability disturbs many BBS operators and service providers. These
groups are lobbying for not merely a codification of a standard, but also
for a statutory adoption of a lesser standard of liability than they believe
service providers could be exposed to in the courts."4 "The arguments
against strict liability for bulletin boards, on-line services, and other ser-
vices that mix communication and publishing functions should be recog-
nized .... A strict liability rule would stifle the development of [the
NlI]." 1 5 Without adoption of a lesser standard, many providers believe
they will be unable to withstand their liability exposure."
planned to appeal the ruling, but the case became moot, as it was recently settled.
See Dan Blake, Prodigy to Appeal Loss in Libel Case, ARiz. REPUBLIC, May 27, 1995,
at El, available in 1995 WL 2797566; Elizabeth Corcoran, $200 Million Libel Suit
Against Prodigy Dropped: On-Line Industry Had Worried About Case, WASH. PosT,
Oct. 25, 1995, at F2.
510. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
511. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 55 (statement of Eugene Volokh,
Professor of Law, UCLA).
512. Kevin M. Caws, Online Service Providers and Copyright Law: The Need for
Change, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 197, 202 (1995).
513. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 55 (statement of Eugene Volokh,
Professor of Law, UCLA) (arguing that it is "critical that copyright be modified, or at
least clarified, to make the basis for liability narrower and more precise").
514. Working Group Hearing H, supra note 4, at 16 (statement of Robert Simons,
General Counsel, Dialog Information Services) (expressing concern that contributory
infringement or vicarious liability may make service providers liable for acts of Nil
users).
515. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 39 (statement of Brian Kahin,
General Counsel, Interactive Multimedia Association).
516. Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 51 (statement of Kent Stuckey,
1. BBS Operators
The primary concerns about BBS operator liability are the lack of
control BBS operators have over material posted on their bulletin boards
and the chilling effects on free speech. As one commentator noted, "even
the most careful systems operators (sysops) cannot effectively screen all
uploaded files for copyright infringing content."" 7 Thus, it is argued.
that liability should be imposed only when the BBS operator has the
actual ability to monitor and control the content of the bulletin
board. 18 Moreover, there is concern that forcing BBS operators to po-.
lice their system will have a chilling effect on speech and virtually elim-
inate the incentive to provide a BBS system."9 The difficulty lies in bal--
ancing the needs of the NIT, i.e., freedom and growth, with the needs of'
content providers, i.e., protection of their rights.Y
2. Service Providers
Arguments against a strict liability standard for service providers are
even more strident.5"' First, some argue that basic principles of fairness
dictate that the actual wrongdoer, the NIl user, be held responsible, rath..
er than an innocent, legitimate entity, the service provider.Y Addi.
tionally, some providers warn that strict liability will burden the NI'S
goals, development and popularity, because additional costs will be forc.-
General Counsel and Secretary, CompuServe, Inc.) ("[Clontinued application of a strict,
liability standard of direct copyright infringement threatens to greatly burden or cut.
off circulation through the extremities as well as the movement or burden the move-
ment of the body of information content"); see also Working Group Hearing III,
supra note 4, at 27 (statement of Ellen Kirsh, Vice President, General Counsel and
Secretary, America Online, Inc.) (maintaining that without elimination of strict liability
standards "the likely result will be the service operators will have to spend large
amounts of time and resources to defend themselves in every case where infringing
material is posted on-line").
517. Bliss, supra note 419, at 557.
518. Kelly Tickle, Note, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Oper-
ators for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 391, 417 (1995).
519. Netanel & Lemley, supra note 220, at *5.
520. Id.
521. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 16 (statement of Robert Simons,
General Counsel, Dialog Information Services).
522. See Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 51 (statement of Kent Stuckey,
General Counsel and Secretary, CompuServe, Inc.) (pointing out the inequity of forc..
ing system providers to pay for the wrongdoing of NII users); Working Group Hear.
ing H, supra note 4, at 55 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Professor of Law, UCLA)
(arguing that liability should not be applied to cases like Playboy but may be appro-
priate for situations such as the Sega case where the service provider actively solicit-
ed and participated in the infringement).
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ibly passed down to end users.523 Finally, many assert they are unable
to effectively control the quantum of information speeding through the
two-way, real-time Nil system. 24
Different proposals to modify the strict liability standard have been
presented. One such proposal is the adoption of an "actual knowledge"
standard, similar to the standard applied in contributory liability
cases.5  Others advocate adoption of a "common carrier" exception.526
523. Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 51 (statement of Kent Stuckey,
General Counsel and Secretary, CompuServe, Inc.).
Strict liability establishes a requirement or an incentive to review and screen
of [sic] censor in order to avoid or reduce liability. Now, if this attempted
[sic], the technology is severely handicapped, both regarding its real time as-
pects and its efficiencies and then on the resorting economic benefit, all
reduced by the cost of screening and censoring, as well as the deprival of
the real time efficiencies. These costs would indeed be passed on to the
consumers and this is the threat of presenting a society of information haves
and have nots. The end users would bear the cost of the potential abuse by
the few under a strict liability regime.
Id. (statement of Kent Stuckey, General Counsel and Secretary, CompuServe, Inc.).
524. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 55 (statement of Allan Arlow,
President and CEO, Computer and Communications Industry Association) (warning
that strict liability will cripple the Nil because service providers will be forced to
convert to a one-way, passive system rather than the current two-way, interactive
system in order to control the "thousands, if not millions of digital transmissions
occurring simultaneously").
525. Under such a standard, providers will not be liable for user infringements un-
less they (1) have actual knowledge that infringing materials are being transmitted,
and (2) have done nothing to remove the infringing materials. Conferences: Copyright
Office Registration Reforms and Restoration Procedures Are Aired, 50 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. 34, *4 (BNA) (May 11, 1995); see Working Group Hearing I,
supra note 4, at 51-52 (statement of Kent Stuckey, General Counsel and Secretary,
CompuServe, Inc.) (supporting an actual knowledge standard, similar to that found in
the Sony decision, which would "greatly enhance" the Nil's development); Working
Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 55 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Professor of
Law, UCLA) (advocating a narrow contributory liability standard); Working Group
Hearing III, supra note 4, at 27-28 (statement of Ellen Kirsh, Vice President, General
Counsel and Secretary, America Online, Inc.) (proposing that the Act require that
service providers cooperate with the copyright owner to determine identity of the NII
user responsible for the infringement and provide reasonable assistance, such as evi-
dentiary support). But see O'Rourke, supra note 422, at *8 (questioning the sufficien-
cy of limiting remedies to actions against actual wrongdoers because of inadequate
resources of NII users).
526. See 17 U.S.C. § 1I1(a)(3) (1994) (common carrier exemption); Working Group
Hearing III, supra note 4, at 55 (statement of Allan Arlow, President and CEO, Com-
puter and Communications Industry Association) (advocating consideration of "certain
Defining the exact function of a service provider may be relevant to
determining the appropriate standard. As service providers vary in their
function and involvement, so do their copyright defendant classifica..
tions.
27
Arguing against a strict liability standard, a representative for America
Online distinguished NII service providers from traditional print publish--
ers:
[Pirint publishers have the opportunity to review what they publish in advance of
publication. This is not the case for on-line service providers. Our medium is in-
teractive and participatory in real time. We have no means of knowing what will
be made available on our services until it is posted there. The volume of content
on our services is so great and comes constantly from so many sources that the
publisher model of content control is totally unrealistic to those of us in the front
lines. 2
America Online alone transmits 800,000 pieces of e-mail along with
30,000 message board postings on their 4000 message boards daily. 5 '
They deal with 620 billion gigabytes of information per week, with 28
gigabytes (200,000 files) of software alone.' In essence, neither Ameri..
ca Online nor any other service provider has the resources to screen,,
censor, or limit the vast amount of NII content without charging consum--
ers much more than $10.00 per month to use their service."
passive transport or common carrier exceptions similar to one presently available to
cable companies under § 111(c)(3)"); see also Working Group Hearing II, supra note
4, at 16 (statement of Robert Simons, General Counsel, Dialog Information Services)
(arguing that common carrier exception should apply and make service providers
immune from liability); Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 55 (statement of
Eugene Volokh, Professor of Law, UCLA) (expressing support for the common carrier
model).
527. Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 54 (statement of Kent Stuckey,
General Counsel and Secretary, CompuServe, Inc.) (asserting that service providers
provide a system function, not a content management function); Working Group
Hearing III, supra note 4, at 28 (statement of Ellen Kirsh, Vice President, General
Counsel and Secretary, America Online, Inc.) ("We are not publishers and we are not
common carriers."); Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 55 (statement of
Allan Arlow, President and CEO, Computer and Communications Industry Association)
(distinguishing between providers who are merely "passive conduits" and others who
are more active).
528. Working Group Hearing III, supra note 4, at 26 (statement of Ellen Kirsh,
Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, America Online, Inc.).
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 27.
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3. Content Provider Opinion
Content providers vehemently oppose the notion of statutorily mandat-
ing liability standards for BBS operators or service providers.' At re-
cent congressional hearings, witnesses argued that such changes should
be left to judicial and market, rather than legislative, forces.' Others
have simply rejected contentions that service providers are not responsi-
ble for, nor able to control, NIl content.'
4. Working Group's Opinion
The Working Group does not agree that legislative action should be
taken to clarify the liability of BBS operators or NIl service provid-
ers.' It believes that "it is-at best-premature to reduce the liability
of any type of service provider in the NIl environment."' Such a codi-
fication, it argues, could not account for the various roles, both active
and passive, that the different service providers play on the NII. 7 Fur-
ther, it contends that as between an innocent service provider and an
innocent copyright owner, the service provider is in a better position to
bear the cost of infringement.' The Working Group notes that on-line
532. See infra notes 548-49 and accompanying text.
533. See Legislation: Two Days of Hearings on NII Bill Consider Provider Liabili-
ty and Fair Use, 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 484 (BNA) (Feb. 15, 1996) (tes-
timony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America). However,
Representative Boucher noted that the provider liability issue must be addressed by
the legislature now because otherwise there will be no incentive for future changes.
Id.
534. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 29 (statement of William Daniels,
Journalist/Attorney, Paul & Stewart) (rejecting the argument that a service provider
.cannot act as a gatekeeper of its own system" and warning that proposed liability
modifications will create "no copyright zones"). Another witness, strongly doubting the
service provider arguments, stated: "If they can figure out a way to charge everybody
to get onto their system, we think they can certainly figure out a way to make sure
that copyrighted works are licensed and compensated for." Working Group Hearing
IV, supra note 4, at 33 (statement of Hilary Rosen, President and Chief Operating Of-
ficer, Recording Industry Association of America). Ms. Rosen noted such consider-
ations are "the cost of doing business." Id.
535. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 122-24.
536. Id. at 122.
537. Id. at 122-23.
538. Id. at 117. Positing that because "someone has to be liable" for compensating
copyright owners, Bruce Lehman expressed his belief that "it's highly likely that [ser-
vice providers will be] the target parties." Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4,
at 54 (statement of Bruce Lehman, Working Group Chairperson).
service providers are not the first innocent parties to operate under strict
liability standards for protection against copyright infringement when
dealing with vast amounts of information-photo finishers are in a simi-
lar position. 9 Thus, the Working Group encourages further develop-
ment of case law and increased participation by service providers in con-
trolling copyright infringement."4
5. A Rebuttable Presumption?
Both types of providers, content and service, have compelling argu-
ments for their position on provider liability."' The case law is, at best,
ambiguous when defining exactly what the liability standards
are--directly, contributorily, and vicariously-for NII service provid-
ers. 2 In order to encourage progressive and meaningful development
of the NI, the rules on provider liability, like the rules on provider rights,
should be clear.' Thus, the legislature should codify exactly what the
standard will be.'
What standard should the legislature adopt? This should depend on the
role of the individual operator or provider. As the courts in Fonovisa,
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. and Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-line Communication Services, Inc. have found, a direct, strict liabili-
ty standard should not apply to a provider who is simply a "passive con-
duit." 5 As the courts in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA and
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. found, active participa-
tion might justify imposition of strict liability."6 The burden of proof
should not fall entirely on innocent providers who are incapable of con-
trolling content, nor should the cost of infringement shift entirely to the
owners whom copyright law was designed to protect."47
This Comment proposes that the standard should be based on existing
case law, but with the following presumptions: (1) that a BBS operator
or service provider is not vicariously or contributorily liable for infringe-
ment by NI users; and (2) that the mere mechanical function of
copying allowed by server hosts is not sufficient to establish direct re-
539. WORING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 116.
540. Id. at 123-24.
541. See supra notes 517-34 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 503-09 and accompanying text.
543. See supra note 513 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 512-13 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 431-32 & 464 and accompanying text
546. See supra notes 144-60, 427-30, 509 & 514 and accompanying text (discussing
Sega).
547. See supra notes 515 & 534 and accompanying text.
548. See supra notes 431-32 & 464 and accompanying text
[Vol. 24: 121, 1996] Information Superhighway
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sponsibility of either a BBS operator or service provider. 49 Such pre-
sumptions could be overcome if the copyright owner proved that it was
more likely than not that either (1) the operator or service provider di-
rectly participated in the infringing activity by otherwise reproducing,
preparing, or distributing copyrighted works," or (2) the operator or
service provider, upon gaining actual knowledge of an infringement,
failed to take reasonable steps to rectify the situation." Such a stan-
dard would help promote the goals of the NII and of copyright law by
preserving the essential balance between content and service providers,
while still allowing the NIl to develop. 2
Adopting concrete standards for rights and liabilities is important to
foster the Ni's development. Unfortunately, all of these standards will be
meaningless without an effective remedy available to those content pro-
viders who pursue a copyright infringement claim. The final section of
this Comment will examine the adequacy of remedies afforded by the
existing copyright scheme and offers proposals for change.'
V. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENT
A. Current Civil .Remedies in the Copyright Act
A successful plaintiff in a copyright infringement action has a number
of statutory remedies available. A plaintiff may choose between actual
damages, including a defendant's profits from the infringement, or statu-
tory damages.' Statutory damages are awarded according to what a
court deems "just"-between $500 and $20,000 per infringed work.5"
The court may also increase statutory damages to $100,000 if the in-
fringement is willfu, or may reduce the damages to $200 if the infringe-
549. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 431-32 & 464 and accompanying text.
551. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
552. See supra notes 521-40 and accompanying text.
553. See infra notes 554-88 and accompanying text
554. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1994).
555. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1994).
ment is innocent.5 Further, a finding that the copying of material is de
minimis may also be relevant to the question of damages.557
A court may "grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it
may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copy-
right."' The court may also order all copies or phonorecords which
violate the copyright owner's rights to be impounded or destroyed.559
Courts further have the discretion to award attorney's fees and costs to
the prevailing party.'n
Evidently, the Working Group concludes that this discretionary system
achieves the proper balance between copyright owners and NII users. In
its final report, the Working Group did not recommend any changes to
the civil remedies in Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act. Noting the balanc-
ing of equities in current law, Chairman Lehman stated that infringers
"have an added protection under existing law in that... it's within the
discretion of the court to decide on the amount of the statutory damag-
es. And it doesn't mean that they have to be the maximum amount at
all."" In response, a witness suggested that "a lot of defendants, espe-
cially a lot of potential defendants, might not be very much [sic] sort of
palliated by the process that some court somewhere in its discretion
might only award a very small amount rather than tens of thousands of
dollars. " "2
B. Current Criminal Penalties for Copyright Violations
Violations of copyright laws can also lead to criminal sanctions. Sec-
tion 506 of the Copyright Act specifically provides that willful copyright
violations for the purposes of commercial advantage can be punished
criminally.' Further, fraudulent copyright notices and fraudulent re-
556. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1994); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29,
35 (2d Cir. 1990) (awarding reduced statutory damages because of defendant's inno-
cence). Innocence as a defense can be relevant in a copyright action, but only as it
applies to an assessment of damages. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp.,
188 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Moreover, a court is required to reduce statu-
tory damages when the infringer is an employee of a nonprofit educational institution
or a nonprofit public broadcaster who reasonably thought the infringing use was fair
use. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1994).
557. Central Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publ'g Co., Inc., 526 F. Supp. 838, 844 (D.C. Colo.
1981).
558.- 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994).
559. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1994).
560. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
561. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 56 (statement of Bruce Lehman,
Working Group Chairperson).
562. Working Group Hearing H, supra note 4, at 56-57 (statement of Eugene
Volokh, Professor of Law, UCLA).
563. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). Violations of the rights of attribution and integrity,
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moval of copyright notices are criminal violations.' Section 2319 of
the Crimes Statute outlines the penalties for criminal copyright infringe-
ment; those penalties include fines of up to $250,000 and imprisonment
for up to five years, depending on the egregiousness of the violation.'
Additionally, the court has the power to order forfeiture and destruction
of infringing material and equipment used for infringement.'
C. Changes to the Law?
1. The LaMacchia Bill: A Pending Proposal from the Legislature
Responding to the perceived inadequacy of criminal penalties evi-
denced by dismissal of the LaMacchia case, Senator Patrick Leahy intro-
duced a bill that would purportedly "close a significant loophole in our
copyright law."" T If passed, that legislation would refine the definition
of "financial gain" in § 101 to include "bartering for and trading of, pirat-
ed software."' The legislation would also add § 506(a)(2), which
would impose criminal sanctions for reproducing or distributing copy-
righted material with a retail value of $5000 or more, even if such activity
were not for profit.5"
2. Working Group Proposals for Anti-Encryption Technology and
Copyright Management Information
The Working Group realizes that problems inherent in the NIl, such as
ease of infringement, difficulty in detection, and lack of enforceability,
will make copyright owners skeptical about relying on even the best legal
remedies for protection.57 Thus, technology, rather than law, may be
however, are specifically excepted from criminal liability. 17 U.S.C. § 506(f) (1994).
564. 17 U.S.C. §§ 506(c)-(d) (1994).
565. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a)-(b) (Supp. 1996).
566. 17 U.S.C. §§ 506(b), 509 (1994).
567. Legislation: Bill Would Strengthen Penalties for Criminal Infringement on
Internet, 50 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 368, *2 (BNA) (Aug. 10, 1995) (hereinaf-
ter Legislation].
568. Id.; see S. 1122, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Aug. 4, 1995) [hereinafter S.
11221.
569. Legislation, supra note 567, at *2; see S. 1122, supra note 568. The violation
would be a misdemeanor where copyrighted material has a retail value of between
$5000 and $10,000 and would be a felony where copyrighted material is worth more
than $10,000. Legislation, supra note 567, at *2; see S. 1122, supra note 568.
570. WORKING GROUP REPoirr, supra note 42, at 230.
the best method of copyright protection in the NIL.57' However, tech-
nology can often be used to outsmart technology. 2 Therefore, the
Working Group recommends a new Chapter 12 for the Copyright Act to
provide strengthened remedy protection for breaches of technological
copyright protections."3 The proposed Chapter 12 would create new
causes of action, containing both civil and criminal remedies, for circum-
vention of copyright protections systems or alteration of copyright man-
agement information.574
The civil remedy provisions in the proposed Chapter 12 closely follow
those of Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act.575 Under the proposed Chapter
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id. at 230-34 & app. 1, pp. 5-11.
574. Id. at 230-36 & app. 1, p. 6. The proposed additions read as follows:
§ 1201. Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
No person shall import, manufacture or distribute any device, product or
component incorporated into a device or product, or offer or perform any
service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without the authority of the copyright
owner or the law, any process, treatment, mechanism or system which pre-
vents or inhibits the violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner under section 106.
§ 1202. Integrity of Copyright Management Information
(a) FALSE COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION. - No person
shall knowingly provide copyright management information that is false, or
knowingly publicly distribute or import for public distribution copyright man-
agement information that is false.
(b) REMOVAL OR ALTERATION OF COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT IN-
FORMATION. - No person shall, without authority of the copyright owner
or the law, (i) knowingly remove or alter any copyright management informa-
tion, (ii) knowingly distribute or import for distribution copyright management
information that has been altered without authority of the copyright owner or
the law, or (iii) knowingly distribute or import for distribution copies or
phonorecords from which copyright management information has been re-
moved without authority of the copyright owner or the law.
(c) DEFINITION. - As used in this chapter, "copyright management
information" means the name and other identifying information of the author
of a work, the name and other identifying information of the copyright own-
er, terms and conditions for uses of the work, and such other information as
the Registrar of Copyrights may prescribe by regulation.
§ 1203. Civil Remedies
(a) CIVIL ACTIONS. - Any person injured by a violation of Sec. 1201
or 1202 may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court for such
violation.
Id. at app. 1, pp. 5-8.
575. Id. at app. 1, pp. 8-11. The civil remedy provisions in proposed Chapter 12 are:
§ 1203. Civil Remedies
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12, permissible statutory damages would be higher than those contained
in Chapter 5; for violations related to copyright protection systems,
courts could award between $200 and $2500 per product or service; and
for copyright management information violations, a court could award
between $2500 and $25,000.576 Additionally, the court could award tre-
ble damages against a person who had violated either § 1201 or § 1202 in
(b) POWERS OF THE COURT. - In an action brought under subsection
(a), the court -
(1) may grant temporary and permanent injunctions on such terms as it
deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a violation;
(2) at any time while an action is pending, may order the impounding,
on such terms as it deems reasonable, of any device or product that is in
the custody or control of the alleged violator and that the court has reason-
able cause to believe was involved in the violation;
(3) may award damages under subsection (c);
(4) in its discretion may allow the recovery of costs by or against any
part other than the United States or an officer thereof;
(5) in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevail-
ing party; and
(6) may, as part of a final judgment or decree finding a violation, order
the remedial modification or the destruction of any device or product in-
volved in the violation that is in the custody or control of the violator or
has been impounded under subsection (2).
(c) AWARD OF DAMAGES. -
(1) IN GENERAL - Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a
violator is liable for either (i) the actual damages and any additional profits
of the violator, as provided by subsection (2) or (ii) statutory damages, as
provided by subsection (3).
(2) ACTUAL DAMAGES. - The court shall award to the complaining
party the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the violation,
and any profits of the violator that are attributable to the violation and are
not taken into account in computing the actual damages, if the complaining
party elects such damages at any time before final judgment is entered.
Id. at app. 1, pp. 8-10.
576. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994) with the following proposal by the Working
Group:
(3) STATUTORY DAMAGES. --
(A) At any time before final judgment is entered, a complaining party
may elect to recover an award of statutory damages for each violation of
section 1201 in the sum of not less than $200 or more than $2,500 per de-
vice, product, offer or performance of service, as the court considers just.
(B) At any time before final judgment is entered, a complaining party
may elect to recover an award of statutory damages for each violation of
section 1202 in the sum of not less than $2,500 or more than $25,000.
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at app. 1, p. 10.
the past three years." Finally, the court could reduce or remit all dam-
ages when the violator acts innocently. 8 In addition, like § 506(c)(d) of
the Act, the newly proposed Chapter 12 contains criminal remedies for
fraudulent violations of copyright management information.7 9
3. Reactions to the Working Group Proposals
Like many of the other proposals forwarded by the Working Group,
there are mixed reactions to the newly proposed Chapter 12. Most par-
ties agree with creating civil and criminal penalties for altering, destroy-
ing, or fraudulently providing copyright management information.'e
However, civil remedies and standards for anti-encryption devices have
created considerable controversy."'
Those in favor of the anti-encryption device provisions argue, like the
Working Group, that such legislation is necessary to protect the only true
safeguard against copyright infringement-technology.' Some propo-
577. Id. at app. 1, p. 11. The text of this proposed provision is as follows:
(4) REPEATED VIOLATIONS. - In any case in which the injured party
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that a person has violat-
ed section 1201 or 1202 within three years after a final judgment was en-
tered against that person for another such violation, the court may increase
the award of damages up to triple the amount that would otherwise be
awarded, as the court considers just.
Id.
578. Id. at app. 1, p. 11. This proposed provision states:
(5) INNOCENT VIOLATIONS. - The court in its discretion may reduce
or remit altogether the total award of damages in any case in which the
violator sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that the violator
was not aware and had no reason to believe that its acts constituted a viola-
tion.
Id.
579. Id. at app. 1, p. 11. The proposed criminal provision is:
§ 1204. Criminal Offenses and Penalties
Any person who violates section 1202 with intent to defraud shall be
fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or
both.
Id.
580. See supra notes 654-56 and accompanying text; see generally Working Group
Hearings I-IV, supra note 4.
581. See Legislatio. Two Days of Hearings on NII Bill Consider Provider Liabili-
ty and Fair Use, 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYGHT J. 484 (BNA) (Feb. 15, 1996).
582. "In order to obtain the richest possible content on the NII it is imperative as
the Working Group has included that devices and services meant to defeat anti-copy-
ing technology be outlawed." Working Group Hearing I, supra note 4, at 31 (state-
ment of Jim Schatz, West Publishing Co.); see also id. at 46 (statement of Edward
Massie, President and CEO, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.) (supporting proposed
legislation safeguarding encryption and other technological protections); Working
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nents even suggested that the anti-defeat legislation should go one step
further. One proponent suggests that not only should there be legislation
preventing tampering with anti-copying systems, but also a mandatory
scheme, similar to that found in the Audio Home Recording Act.'
Such a scheme would require the inclusion of devices in machines that
respond to anti-copying software.' Other proponents suggest that
criminal responsibility should be assigned because "[t]oo many NII ban-
dits, some operating totally in the underground economy, will scoff at
the threat of civil damages." '
Others argue that although some legislation may be necessary to pro-
tect anti-encryption, the proposed legislation goes too far.' Proponents
contend that by replacing the "substantial, noninfringing use" standard of
Sony with a "primary purpose and effect" standard, the Working Group's
proposal may outlaw technology and services that are necessary for
legitimate purposes such as reverse engineering, home and archival copy-
ing, and program debugging. 7 Because the devices themselves cannot
tell the difference between legal and illegal uses, courts should be per-
mitted to continue applying the Sony standard of "substantial,
noninfringing use," which would presumably leave room for anti-encryp-
tion devices that are used for legitimate purposes.' Therefore, contin-
ued application of the Sony standard, rather than the "primary purpose
Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 58 (statement of Mike Malone, CEO, Griffn Soft-
ware Corp., on behalf of the Alliance to Promote Software Innovation) (backing pro-
posed amendment to outlaw anti-encryption devices).
583. Working Group Hearing II, supra note 4, at 63 (statement of Robert Hadl,
Vice President and General Counsel, MCA).
584. Id.
585. Legislation: Two Days of Hearings on NII Bill Consider Provider Liability
and Fair Use, 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 484 (BNA) (Feb. 15, 1996) (testi-
mony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America).
586. See Netanel & Lemley, supra note 220, at *2; see also Samuelson, supra note
81, at 26 (referring to a recent article in Wired, Professor Samuelson notes the pro-
posal is "so broad, publishers could probably use it to ban sales of photocopy ma-
chines").
587. Legislation: Two Days of Hearings on NIl Bill Consider Provider Liability
and Fair Use, 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 484 (BNA) (Feb. 15, 1996) (testi-
mony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America); Netanel &
Lemley, supra note 220, at *2. "Even for such devices where it can be clearly seen
that the primary purpose is to bypass software protection schemes, program develop-
ers may need them in order to (temporarily) bypass their own protection schemes, in
order to debug the program, or the protection scheme itself." Rubin, supra note 222,
at *2.
588. Jensen, supra note 226, at *15-16; Rubin, supra note 222, at *2.
and effect" test is the best way to protect against infringing activity,
while still allowing for legitimate use of the technology, thus preserving
the balance envisioned by the Copyright Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NII is the modem Wild West-the new Electronic Frontier. Much
like the days of old, the primitive Digital Frontier is rapidly evolving. But,
the new frontier will not survive if law and order does not prevail. Those
who drive the Information Superhighway may exit from fear that they
will be pillaged by the new Highwayman-the new Highwayman who is
flying through Cyberspace in a starship, seeking information. The new
Highwayman may choose not to board that starship if the ride is too
expensive or too dangerous. This is the essence of copyright law balance
on the NII.
The proposals for change, and those for preservation of the status quo,
given in this Comment reflect the balance envisioned by the United
States Constitution. Without protection of the rights of authors and cre-
ators, the Information Superhighway may be underdeveloped; without
security for the contributions of investors, the Information Superhighway
may be underfinanced; without preservation of the liberties of the public,
the Information Superhighway may be underutilized; and without defend-
ing the Constitution, what are we left with? By protecting al/ those who
brave this new frontier we can establish justice, not just law and order,
in the new digital environment, thereby promoting the progress of soci-
ety, science, and the useful arts.
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